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Casenote
STOP BASHING BREYER: HOW THE JUSTICE’S POWERFUL
SUBTLETY OUT-WITTED SCALIA IN AEREO III
I. INTRODUCTION: NOT CLEVER ENOUGH
In a single opinion, the United States Supreme Court eviscer-
ated the streaming-technology company Aereo.  Aereo’s future
does not look bright.1  Legal commentators say there is no future.2
Aereo’s future was much brighter a few months ago, as major sports
leagues were threatening to make free broadcasts part of a subscrip-
tion if the Supreme Court sided with Aereo.3  Broadcasters were
concerned about their billions in retransmission licensing fees.4
Under the traditional television model, broadcasters are paid
retransmission consent fees for cable and satellite companies to
show broadcasters’ programming, which includes sports events.5
Even watching “NBC sports LiveExtra” on a computer, or through
an ESPN Xbox application, requires a subscription to cable before
viewing the sports game on the screen is possible.6  Aereo has de-
1. See Kwame Opam, Aereo Turns to Congress to Reverse Supreme Court Decision,
THE VERGE (July 1, 2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/7/1/58608
88/aereo-turns-to-congress-to-reverse-supreme-court-decision (reporting Aereo
CEO urging its former customers to talk to Congress about changing laws so Aereo
could function legally); see also ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
[hereinafter “Aereo III”].
2. See, e.g., Bill Rosenblatt, TiVo Buys Aereo Assets at Auction. Is a Legal Aereo
Coming?, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2015, 10:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billrosen-
blatt/2015/03/01/tivo-buys-aereo-assets-at-auction-is-a-legal-aereo-coming/
(“Aereo officially died last week.”).
3. See Sam Gustin, NFL, MLB Warn of the End of Free Sports on Television, TIME
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/11/18/nfl-nba-warn-of-the-end-
of-free-sports-on-television/.
4. See Alex Barinka & Edmund Lee, Aereo Court Loss Protects $4 Billion in Broad-
cast Fees, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (June 25, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2014-06-25/aereo-court-loss-protects-4-billion-in-broadcast-
fees (protecting $4 billion for broadcasters).  In order to be labeled a cable com-
pany in Aereo IV, Aereo revealed in 2014 that its subscription numbers were below
80,000 over ten cities at the end of 2013. See Cassandra Khaw, Aereo Reveals Appall-
ingly Low Subscriber Numbers, THE VERGE (July 22, 2014, 3:23 AM), http://www
.theverge.com/2014/7/22/5925347/aereo-subscriber-numbers (discussing which
cities had which numbers).
5. See Gustin, supra note 3.
6. See Michael Humphrey, Aereo and the Cord Cutters’ Ethical Dilemma, FORBES
(June 26, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelhumphrey/
2014/06/26/aereo-and-the-cord-cutters-ethical-dillemma/.  Humphrey notes that
(149)
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scribed itself as “reinvent[ing]” television by making television an-
tennas small, moving them to “the cloud,” tying them to a cloud-
based DVR system, and allowing its users to watch, record, rewind,
and replay when the user wants.7  When the United States Supreme
Court decided that Aereo was infringing others’ copyrights when it
used its tiny antennas to stream over the air broadcasting to In-
ternet devices, Aereo’s most wealthy investor, Barry Diller, noted
that his wallet would not suffer, but innovation would.8  Broadcast-
ers disagreed.9
While Aereo CEO Chet Kanojia sounded a battle cry against
technological suppression, broadcasters were pointing out that sup-
pression is not unlawful if it is stealing.10  Reed Hundt, the former
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, called
Aereo a “‘trick’” posing as innovation.11  The United States Su-
a possible new normal is “cable-subscribing” friends sharing their passwords with
their cord-cutting friends. See id.
7. See Aereo, How Aereo Works, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2014), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=IQCEKFkPVio (noting that a “recording starts” when the user de-
cided to watch (stream) a television program); see also BloombergBusiness, Inside
the Tiny Aereo Technology Threatening TV, YOUTUBE (March 25, 2014), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=OG_SSpr_HnM (Aereo gave Bloomberg an “inside look”
into an Aereo factory and Aereo technology); accord ReasonTV, Aereo, the Supreme
Court, and the Future of TV, YOUTUBE (June 1, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=SXmNE_EsJ9I (interviewing Aereo CEO Chet Kanojia about technology
and broadcasters’ opposition).  Steve Effros of Effros Communications was inter-
viewed and noted that Aereo is a “gimmick” because while the second transmission
of a copyrighted work is not infringement as it is not a “performance for profit,”
Aereo never paid any copyright licensing the first time. See ReasonTV, supra (stat-
ing that he would take “broadcasters off the air” and use broadcasting frequencies
to bolster Wi-Fi instead).  James Grimmelmann, Professor of Law at University of
Maryland, was also interviewed and noted that Aereo was not taking advantage of a
“loophole” because it applied the “complex” contours of copyright law to the in-
ternet which is so different from telephone and cable lines. See id. Grimmelmann
is noted as filing an Amicus Brief in support of Aereo in the United States Su-
preme Court. See id.
8. See Humphrey, supra note 6 (“‘It’s not a big [financial] loss for us, but I do
believe blocking this technology is a big loss for consumers.’” (alteration in
original)).
9. See Aereo CEO: We’re Disappointed in the Outcome, But Our Work is Not Done,
CNBC (June 25, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101769731# (noting
National Association of Broadcasters’ President and CEO Gordon Smith spoke on
Aereo).
10. See id.; see also Aereo, Inside Aereo, YOUTUBE (June 16, 2014), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=DDOQ0qwgy5Y (Aereo CEOs discussing Aereo’s “alterna-
tive,” “next generation” technology).
11. See Aereo CEO: We’re Disappointed In the Outcome, But Our Work Is Not Done,
supra note 9 (Barry Diller arguing that “the service would have offered consumers
an ‘alternative to the bundle’”); see also Schuyler Moore, Aereo Follows Grokster and
Napster Into the Trash Bin of History, FORBES (June 30, 2014, 2:32 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/schuylermoore/2014/06/30/the-aereo-decision/ (“The simple
truth is that Aereo’s entire business plan was based on piracy, pure and simply.”).
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preme Court agreed.12  After the release of the opinion, Aereo in-
formed its customers, via its website, that it filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy and abandoned its various other court cases.13
12. See Mark P. McKenna, The Limits of the Supreme Court’s Technological Analo-
gies: The Misguided Aereo Decision Shows Why Technical Details Matter, SLATE (June 26,
2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/
06/abc_v_aereo_ruling_the_supreme_court_s_terrible_technological_analogies
.html (noting that depending on whether one views Aereo as a viewer putting an
antenna on roof or stealer who places themselves on higher ground than broad-
casters by not paying licensing fees, the view will color one’s opinion on Supreme
Court’s outcome).  McKenna, professor of law at University of Notre Dame, dis-
closed that he “was a signatory on an amicus brief in the case authored by law
professors David Post and James Grimmelmann,” which was “adopted by the dis-
sent.” Id. He argued that the Supreme Court’s decision was “dictating technologi-
cal design” by not drawing a more “general[ ]” analogy for legal decision-making.
See id.
13. See Chet Kanojia, A Letter To Our Consumers: The Next Chapter, AEREO.COM
(Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.aereo.com/ (on file with author) (“Accordingly, to-
day, we filed for Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.  We also appointed Law-
ton Bloom of Argus to server as Aereo’s Chief Restructuring Officer during this
period.  Chapter 11 will permit Aereo to maximize the value of its business and
assets without the extensive cost and distraction of defending drawn out litigation
in several courts.”).  Mr. Kanojia noted Aereo’s innovate mark on history and la-
mented Aereo’s demise. See id. (“We have traveled a long and challenging road.
We stayed true to our mission and we believe that we have played a significant part
in pushing the conversation forward, helping force positive change in the industry
for consumers.  We feel incredibly lucky to have had the opportunity to build
something as meaningful and special as Aereo.  With so many shifts and advances
in technology, there has never been a more perfect time to take risks, challenging
the status quo and build something special.  Thank you for all your support.  Your
emails, tweets, Facebook posts and letters have meant the world to us.  We are
incredibly grateful to have gone on this journey together.”); see also Aereo’s Asset
Values Hurt by Court Case: Kanojia, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (March 9, 2015, 9:59 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-03-09/aereo-s-asset-values-hurt-by-
court-case-kanojia (stating he was “disappointed in June” when asked about
whether he was disappointed about the price he received for Aereo’s assets at auc-
tion).  Mr. Kanojia did not believe that the broadcaster’s prediction of Aereo’s
demise was a “foregone conclusion,” as Aereo “went all the way to the Supreme
Court.” See Aereo’s Asset Values Hurt By Court Case: Kanojia, supra (noting that Ka-
nojia raised one hundred million for Aereo).  Countering, he noted that broad-
casters “must be online.” See id. (noting that it is a “shame” that “sling” is
redefining the bundle on its own without broadcasters’ network television input).
Also Mr. Kanojia commented “good for them” in TiVo “grabbing” Aereo’s con-
sumer list. See id.
Reportedly, TiVo bought Aereo’s trademark and customer lists for an unspeci-
fied amount, while all of Aereo’s assets sold for $2 million at an auction with only
ten bidders. See Mariella Moon, Aereo Gets Only $2 Million from Selling Assets to TiVo
and Other Companies, ENGADGET (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/
02/27/aereo-auction-tivo/ (“Aereo was expecting to sell its assets for at least $4
million (and up to $31 million).”).  TiVo seems to have its sights set on becoming a
legal Aereo. See Mariella Moon, TiVo Wants to Become the Legal Version of Aereo, EN-
GADGET (May 14, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/05/14/tivo-aereo/.  In
the end, Mr. Kanojia sided with Justice Scalia’s dissent in noting that the majority
opinion “was so results driven it was not the law). See Aereo’s Asset Values Hurt by
Court Case: Kanojia, supra (noting Aereo was “right on the merits” whether it got a
fair shot or not).  Mr. Kanojia believed the majority was “fabricating” the law by
3
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The recent Aereo decision has been greatly critiqued.14  Con-
sumers generally agree that the Supreme Court did the right thing
in preventing Aereo from continuing.15  Legally however, there has
been minimal support for Justice Breyer’s majority in Aereo III.16
Charging ahead, Justice Scalia’s dissent was the majority’s biggest
critic.17
This case note rushes to Justice Breyer’s aid—although he
needs no defenders—and asserts that the Supreme Court’s decision
was not overly broad or incorrect.18  Contrary to Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent, the majority opinion struck the appropriate balance between a
copyright owner’s rights and innovation.  Section II provides back-
“going off [a] 1960’s . . . staffers memo.” See id. (noting that this is how a business
man and engineer read the opinion).
Since then, he formed a new company with twenty-five others and the com-
pany is in the experimental phase. See id.  This next phase has been confirmed.
See Peter Kafka, As Aereo Winds Down, Founder Chet Kanojia Starts His Next Venture at
Project Decibel, RECODE.NET (Jan. 8, 2015, 9:24 AM), http://recode.net/2015/01/
08/as-aereo-winds-down-founder-chet-kanojia-starts-his-next-venture-at-project-dec-
ibel/ (noting he took “some of his former employees”).
14. See infra notes 315–51 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Bill Snyder, Aereo Deserves to be Put Out of Business for Stealing Con-
tent, CIO (June 27, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2426291/con-
sumer-technology/aereo-deserves-to-be-put-out-of-business-for-stealing-content
.html (noting that broadcasters will not continue making content if they are not
reimbursed for their intellectual property).  CBS even noted that it would become
a cable network if Aereo was deemed a valid endeavor by the Supreme Court. See
Alexandra Cheney, Leslie Moonves and Jeff Shell Defend Movie Industry, Blast Aereo for
‘Stealing’ Content, VARIETY (Apr. 30, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://variety.com/2014/
biz/news/les-moonves-and-jeff-shell-defend-movie-biz-blast-aereo-for-stealing-con-
tent-1201168099/.  CBS chief Leslie Moonves was “heated” when arguing that
Aereo was trying to confuse everyone by pushing “innovation” when “‘the law
[was] not on their side.’” Id.
16. See, e.g., Mitch Stoltz, Symposium: Aereo decision injects uncertainty into copy-
right, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
06/symposium-aereo-decision-injects-uncertainty-into-copyright/ (noting that the
majority opinion did not simply read the Copyright Act, but brought “flexibility,”
and with it “uncertainty,” to the Act).  Even less severe articles have found fault
with Justice Breyer’s majority. See, e.g., Sarah E. Claypool, Comment, Aereo, Unli-
censed Retransmissions, And Emerging Technologies: The Case for Congressional Action,
100 IOWA L. REV. 1789, 1804–07 (2015) (noting that the majority’s analysis was not
shallow and delved into the legislative history quite extensively).
17. See infra notes 269–88 and accompanying text; see also Devlin Hartline, On
Scalia’s Aereo Dissent, LAW THEORIES BLOG (Sep. 3, 2014), http://lawtheories.com/
?p=1675 (describing Justice Scalia’s dissent as “acerbic”).
18. See infra notes 380–448 and accompanying text.  One reason the Honora-
ble Stephen G. Breyer needs no defenders is because he has previously written on
the intricacies of copyright.  See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 281 (1970), and Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Look Back
Across Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635 (2011), the latter of which was
based on his November 4, 2010 keynote delivered at The George Washington Uni-
versity Law School symposium.
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss1/4
2016] AEREO III:  STOP BASHING BREYER 153
ground with a discussion of the Copyright Act of 1976’s purpose,
intent, and language; cases that preceded Aereo; and cases that de-
fined Aereo.19  Section III will discuss Aereo’s technology and long
journey from Aereo I to Aereo IV, the latter ruling that while Aereo
was like a cable company it could not pay licensing as a cable com-
pany.20  Section IV will analyze Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in
Aereo III and support its subtle power, contrary to Justice Scalia’s
categorization of the opinion in his dissent.21  Section V will con-
clude in support of Justice Breyer’s opinion.
II. BACKGROUND: FIGHT OR FLIGHT?
A. Cable Television: A Brief Synopsis
Television is defined as a “transmission of audio and video sig-
nals.”22  “Broadcast television” is a transmission “over public air-
waves” that requires an antenna attached to one’s television.23
Conversely, “[c]able television” travels through “coaxial cable” that
runs to the cable box (“‘set-top box’ provided by a cable com-
pany”), which is plugged into the consumer’s television.24  Cable
companies are providers of “basic cable” (ex. AMC), “premium
cable channels” (ex. HBO), and “broadcast television stations” —all
19. See infra notes 22–140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 141–298 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 299–448 and accompanying text.
22. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp.
2d 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter Cablevision I] (“Television involves the
transmission of audio and video signals—‘a moving picture, plus sound.’”  (inter-
nal citation omitted)).
23. Id.
24. Id.  It has been noted that the difference between broadcast television (ex.
NBC) and cable television (ex. HBO) goes beyond delivery methods, and is not
simply that the FCC polices only the former, but that the former’s outlook on how
viewers perceive life, and coincidentally what viewers enjoy, is more light-hearted.
See Neal Gabler, Cable vs. broadcast: TV’s Different Mindsets, L.A. TIMES (April 4,
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/04/entertainment/la-ca-cable-cos-
mology4-2010apr04 (“It’s a matter of cosmology—the way they perceive the uni-
verse.  Cable TV and broadcast TV purvey different worlds, and cable’s is darker,
bleaker, more complicated and less forgiving.”).  Also, broadcast television
emerged toward the end of the 1940s, was about engrossing the “broadest possible
audience,” and, subsequently, was focused on selling products, not content. See id.
Because it was hoping to sell products, broadcast television did not want to rock-
the-boat and upset its wide-ranging audience; it simply wanted to entertain with
cookie cutter characters. See id.
In stark contrast, cable television was born out of the audiences’ “anxieties.”
See id.  Cable television tells viewers that life is messy and painful, and allows view-
ers to root for characters they can identify with. See id. (“[Cable television] tells us
that we are not necessarily good and that neither is our world.”).  While broadcast
television tries to be edgy (e.g. FX’s “Nip Tuck”), it misunderstands complex char-
acters and ends up creating caricatures (e.g. FX’s “Nip Tuck”). See id.
5
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of which are provided at select times during a programming sched-
ule (i.e. “linear channels”).25
B. Copyright Act of 1976
1. Congressional Purpose
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by se-
curing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries.”26  Copyright law con-
siders artistic expression to contribute to the public good.27  The
author’s compensation is a “secondary consideration.”28
Nevertheless, payment facilitates the public good of artistic ex-
pression which induces authors to produce better quality work.29
Ultimately, the Copyright Act is meant to give the authors (or own-
ers) a steel backbone through which to assert their ownership rights
and monetarily incentivize authors to produce quality expression.30
Evidenced by the Copyright Act’s aim, Congress was not seeking to
make copyright protection the goal itself.31
25. See Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 610.  Cable has an interesting history.
See generally History of Cable, CALCABLE.ORG, http://www.calcable.org/learn/history-
of-cable/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  Not to mention an evolution. See generally
Cable’s Story, NCTA.COM, https://www.ncta.com/who-we-are/our-story (last vis-
ited Mar. 9, 2015).  This evolution seems to be starting to unravel, as Nielsen has
noted that it will begin counting viewers who watch online (such as on Netflix,
Amazon, etc.). See David Bauder, Neilsen to Begin Counting Broadband Viewing Homes,
YAHOO! (Feb. 21, 2013, 4:00 PM), https://www.yahoo.com/movies/s/nielsen-be-
gin-counting-broadband-viewing-homes-165248375.html.  Nielsen itself noted that
just because homes do not have televisions does not mean they don’t watch mul-
timedia. See generally Zero-TV Doesn’t Mean Zero Video, NIELSEN (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2013/zero-tv-doesnt-mean-zero-
video.html (noting five percent of homes do not use cable or satellite to receive
their entertainment).
26. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘au-
thor’s’ creative labor.”).
28. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
(drawing parallel to patent statutes’ considerations).
29. See id. (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)) (noting
Chief Justice Hughes’ belief that the author’s benefit must be directly connected
to product quality, which is thought to better benefit the public).
30. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (citing Washingtonian Pub.
Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)) (noting that author’s pay should be
equivalent to the quality).
31. See Amanda Asaro, Comment, Stay Tuned: Whether Cloud-Based Service Prov-
iders Can Have Their Copyright Cake And Eat It Too, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1115
(2014).
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2. Congressional Intent
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 overhaul, the United States
Supreme Court decided Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc.32 and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc.33 Fortnightly dealt with the
Fortnightly Corporation, which was helping residents of a “hilly”
area (who could not receive local television broadcasting stations by
attaching antennas to their roofs), by selling those residents a sub-
scription to have coaxial cables run from some of Fortnightly’s an-
tennas on top of those hills to the residents’ home televisions.34
The users of this service could choose between the broadcast sta-
tions by turning a knob on their television sets.35  United Artists
Television was a copyright holder of movies and had licensing
agreements with the broadcasting stations, and typically did not al-
low CATV systems to transmit their programming.36
The Fortnightly Court found that Fortnightly did not perform
under the 1909 Copyright Act.37  The Court chose not to apply a
volitional standard to Fortnightly because the Court thought apply-
ing the volitional standard would cause apartment owners, whose
tenants often shared an antenna, to be liable as well.38  Instead, the
Court asked CATV’s “function” in “television broadcasting and re-
ception.”39  Noting that “broadcasters perform” and “viewers do not
perform,” the Court defined CATV as a viewer because CATV sim-
ply “enhance[d]” the viewer’s reception of the broadcaster’s con-
32. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
33. 415 U.S. 394 (1974); see Thomas M. Cramer, Comment, The Copyright Act
and the Frontier of “Television”: What to Do About Aereo, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97,
103 (2014) (noting that these two cases “[s]et[ ] the stage”).
34. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 391–92.
35. See id. at 392.  Fortnightly did not “edit[ ] the programs received nor origi-
nate[ ] any programs of its own.” See id.
36. See id. at 393 (noting some licensing agreements “specifically prohibited”
the transmission by CATV).
37. See id. at 395.
38. See id. at 397.  Direct infringement’s “volition” is merely asking whether
the infringer—by his own willful act—is stealing from the author or owner of the
copyrighted work. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 12B.06 (2014).  If the infringer is being forced to act, then his or her
“automatic response” is not volitional by definition. See id.; see also Wolk v. Kodak
Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 742–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Kodak’s au-
tomated website feature of virtually placing plaintiff’s copyrighted pictures on a
product during preview mode was not direct infringement). See infra note 422 for
a discussion on applying the volitional standard to Aereo.  Justice Scalia’s volitional
standard used in Aereo III has been attributed to “legal principles of agency and
responsibility.” See James Y. Stern, ABC v. Aereo and the Humble Judge, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 81, 88 (2015) (noting volition standard may not be “up to the task in the
long run”).
39. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 397.
7
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tent.40  The CATV was simply a viewer helping another viewer.41
CATV systems were not broadcasting, “rebroadcast[ing],” editing,
or choosing the programs.42  Therefore, CATV could not be de-
fined as a broadcaster.43
Teleprompter also dealt with a CATV system, but this system both
received local broadcasting signals that residents could acquire with
their own antennas, and “imported ‘distant’ signals,” which the re-
sidents could not acquire.44  The Teleprompter Court agreed with
Fortnightly and found that even CATV systems with control over
choosing  “distant” broadcasting stations was not enough to make
the CATV system more than a viewer for liability purposes.45  This
was because the CATV system still simply performed a subscriber
“function” because there was no “nexus” between the CATV system
receiving and sending the copyrighted work and creating or pro-
curing the copyrighted content like a broadcaster does.46
When overhauling the Copyright Act of 1909 for the 1976 ver-
sion, Congress specifically demonized cable television systems
(CATV) by stating that a “cable television system [ ] perform[s]
when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.”47  Congress,
thus, extended the “perform” definition and sought to include “all
kinds of equipment for reproducing or amplifying sounds or visual
40. See id. at 399.  “The television broadcaster . . . supplies his audience not
with visible images but only with electronic signals.” See id. at 398.  “The viewer
conversely . . . provides the equipment to convert electronic signals into audible
sound and visible images.” See id. (comparing the theater exhibitor and audience
which the 1909 Act was aimed at).  Justice Fortas noted that it was not this simple
because precedent held a performance to include “the use of mechanical equip-
ment to extend a broadcast to a significantly wider public than the broadcast
would otherwise enjoy.” See id. at 406 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citing Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Corp., 283 U.S. 191 (1931)).
41. See id. at 399–400 (noting that a viewer could just place his antenna on a
hill, or several viewers could erect one large antenna on the same hill).
42. See id. at 400–01.
43. See id. at 401.
44. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 401 (1974).
45. See id. at 403, 408, 414.
46. See id. at 405, 409–10.
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5677 (noting the performance must be public to be infringing).  Prior to the
1976 version enactment, the performance “for profit” analysis was still being ap-
plied despite the difficulty in striking a balance between protecting the copyright
owner and the public. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
152–53, 162–64 (1975) (finding that a store owner who played a radio in his store
was neither performing by turning his radio on, nor could he be expected to li-
cense everything that came over his radio—even if the performance played was
public and “for profit”).
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images.”48  The congressional report was very broad, in fact stating,
“any sort of transmitting apparatus, any type of electronic retrieval
system, and any other techniques and systems not yet in use or even
invented.”49
Congress noted that the Transmit Clause was also broadly in-
tended to capture “all conceivable forms and combinations of wires
and wireless communications media, including but by no means
limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them.”50  It
specifically noted that “every method by which the images or
sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and
conveyed” falls under a transmission.51  Congress also noted this
transmission will be a public transmission “if the transmission
reaches the public in [any] form.”52
The report continues, noting that “ ‘public’” is “the public at
large,” which means people do not need to be in the same room,
nor does there need to be evidence that the person actually re-
ceived the transmission.53  Thus, the report notes that the lan-
guage, “ ‘in the same place or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times’” considers even a “limited segment of
the public” in private rooms to be the “public.”54
3. Plain Language
The Copyright Act of 1976 holds that a copyright owner has
certain “exclusive rights” over his copyrighted material, which in-
clude: “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or pho-
norecords;” and “in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”55
48. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5677.
49. See id.  Authors have stated that this broad reaching definition is the rea-
son for the current mess as “transmission” and “performance” are being swept up
into the same definition. See, e.g., Kevin W. Yoegel, Comment, The Aereo Loophole: A
Retrospective Inquiry into the Legality of Antenna Farms and Internet-Based Television, 87
TEMP. L. REV. 339, 367–68 (2015) (proposing change to Copyright Act that would
remove all references to “performance”).




53. See id. at 64–65.
54. See id. at 65 (meaning “occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a
cable television service”).
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4) (2002) (emphasis added).  Other rights in-
clude: (2) “derivate works,” (3) selling copies, (5) displaying work publicly, and (6)
9
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Specifically pertaining to the reproduction right:
“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies”
includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.56
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi-
tory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of
this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultane-
ously with its transmission.57
Related to the public performance right:
To “perform” a work means to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or
process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make
the sounds accompanying it audible.58
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of per-
sons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance
or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or
to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
performing “sound recordings” “publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
56. 17 U.S.C § 101 (emphasis added).  Note that phonorecords are not in-
volved here because they “are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device.  The term ‘phonorecords’ includes the material object in
which the sounds are first fixed.” See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. (emphasis added).  The act also notes “[a] ‘device’, ‘machine’, or
‘process’ is one now known or later developed.” See id.
10
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the members of the public capable of receiving the per-
formance or display receive it in the same place or in sepa-
rate places and at the same time or at different times.59
Notably, Congress has proposed amendments to section 106
(exclusive rights section); however, none of the amendments ex-
pand the Copyright Act to Internet services.60  Likewise, no amend-
ments that involve section 101 (pertaining to the reproduction
right) change the definitions at issue.61  Additionally, prior to 1967,
there was no Transmit Clause (17 U.S.C. § 101) and the definitions
were slight and contained mainly in the sections.62  For instance,
the public performance right (and definition) stated, “[t]o perform
or represent the copyrighted work publicly . . . it may in any man-
ner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, pro-
duced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce,
or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever.”63
C. Pre-Aereo: Public Performance Issues Emerge
The following cases set a framework for the analysis of “public
performance” in Aereo III (17 U.S.C. § 101 “publicly” definition).
Some of the following cases were also discussed by Cablevision I and
II, which served as the guide for Aereo’s service.64
59. See id. (emphasis added).
60. See S. Res. 2045, 113th Cong. (2014) (“To amend title 17, United States
Codes, to secure the rights of visual artists to copyright, to provide for resale royal-
ties, and for other purposes.”); accord H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. (2014); see also H.R.
3219, 113th Cong. (2013) (“To amend title 17, United States Code, to provide
copyright owners in sound recordings with the exclusive right to negotiate in the
marketplace the performance of their works to the public by means of an audio
transmission, and for other purposes.”).
61. See H.R. 238, 114th Cong. (2015) (“To amend . . . with respect to the
definition of ‘widow’ and ‘widower’ . . . .”); accord S. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015); S.
Res. 2919, 114th Cong. (2014); H.R. 5617, 114th Cong. (2014).
62. See H.R. 2083, 80th Cong. (1974), available at http://law.copyrightdata
.com/index.php (select December 31, 1974 to Dec. 31, 1977); see also Cramer,
supra note 33, at 104 (noting Transmit Clause was added in 1976).
63. See H.R. 2083, 80th Cong. (1974); see also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 n.15 (1968) (noting legislature intended to
cover a person in the audience who copied down a play word-for-word).
64. See infra notes 126, 140; see also Matthew Schruers, Symposium: Aereo Copy-
right Decision Creates Uncertainty for the Cloud, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:55
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-copyright-decision-
creates-uncertainty-for-the-cloud/ (“Aereo’s legal rationale turned on the reason-
ing of the 2008 Cablevision decision in the Second Circuit, which the Supreme
Court declined to hear.”).
11
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Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.65 dealt with
the “recent technological developments” of a Maxwell video store.66
The issue was whether the video store could charge a patron for
selecting a movie from the store’s list and watching that movie in
the privacy of Maxwell’s small, “private booths.”67  While the Third
Circuit noted that Maxwell lawfully purchased the movies on its list,
the movie showings were public performances because the video
store was open to the public (even though they charged a fee), and
repeat showing of one movie-copy was a performance.68
The Ninth Circuit, in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors, Inc.,69 found that the renting of videos to
hotel guests for use in hotel room videodisc players was not in-
fringement.70  Movies were available to rent by guests at the hotel’s
lobby gift shop and, if the guests asked for help, hotel employees
would help the guests play the movies in their rooms.71  The only
issue before the court was whether the performance was considered
public.72  The court distinguished Redd by noting that a hotel’s na-
ture “incidentally” must allow the movie watching because the
guests presume it.73
Under the first prong of the Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit
did not find public performance because—although a hotel room
is “‘open to the public’” —it becomes private when rented.74
Under the Transmit Clause, the court did not find public perform-
ance because it assumed that the Transmit Clause required the
movies to be sent beyond (to or from) the hotel room itself in or-
der to be transmitted.75  Thus, because the transmission of “signal”
65. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
66. See id. at 157–58 (noting technology could still be “analyzed and resolved
within existing statutory framework”).
67. See id. at 156–57 (noting Maxwell had eighty-five rooms in two stores, and
the booths were four feet by six feet and could fit up to four people).
68. See id. at 157–59 (following Professor Nimmer’s scholarship on one-movie
copy).
69. 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
70. See id. at 282.
71. See id. at 279.
72. See id. (noting that hotel did not argue that its use was not performance
because the Copyright Act specifically defines performance for motion picture).
73. See id. at 280–81.
74. See id. at 281 (noting there is more privacy assumed in rented hotel room
than more open “hotel meeting rooms”).
75. See id. at 282 (“In sum, when one adds up the various segments of clause
(2), one must conclude that under the transmit clause a public performance at
least involves sending out some sort of signal via a device or process to be received
by the public at a place beyond the place from which it [was] sent.”).
12
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from movie to television occurred in the private hotel room, the
performance was not transmitted “to the public.”76
In NFL v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture,77 the NFL was unhappy
when PrimeTime decided to transmit weekly football games via sat-
ellite to United States households that could receive “adequate
over-the-air broadcast reception” in their areas.78  The court re-
jected PrimeTime’s argument that transmission to satellites and
downloads from satellites to user were not public performance.79
The court was persuaded that public performance, as defined by
the Copyright Act, constituted each “step in the process” in which
the transmission traveled to the viewer.80
In Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems,
PLC,81 defendants streamed “free, over-the-air broadcast television”
to Internet and mobile devices.82  Defendants did not contest this
accusation by plaintiffs who: “produce[d] and license[d] the distri-
bution of copyrighted works” to free broadcast networks and li-
censed with cable, satellite television, and Internet services.83  The
defendants relied on Cablevision II when arguing that they were us-
ing technology that was accessible to the average consumer and
provided private performances for each user.84
The court was not persuaded.85  The court found Cablevision’s
reading of the statute not determinative; the court believed a more
logical reading of the Copyright Act would find infringement when
performance transmissions were public even if the transmission was
76. See id.
77. 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000).
78. See id. at 11 (noting PrimeTime had paid for licenses to send these trans-
missions to houses that could not receive quality broadcast reception).  The NFL
televised its games over broadcast, while also recording these games and register-
ing these recordings with the Copyright Office. See id.
79. See id. at 12.
80. See id. at 13 (citing WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d
622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)) (agreeing with Judge Posner that sending signals
through cable systems does not expunge one of liability).
81. 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
82. See id. at 1140.
83. See id. (noting defendants did not challenge plaintiffs’ copyright
ownership).
84. See id. at 1141; see also Cablevision II, infra note 128.
85. See Fox Television Stations, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (stating court would not
subscribe to Second Circuit precedent, which had not been adopted by Ninth
Circuit).
13
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not public.86  Thus, the unique copies were not important because
“in public” was not being argued, but rather “to the public.”87
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC88 was extremely sim-
ilar to BarryDriller’s facts and players; FilmOn X is a mini antenna
system that transmits free broadcast signals to users over the In-
ternet for a fee.89  Both parties agreed that Aereo technology and
BarryDriller technology was equivalent to FilmOn X technology.90
The court found that FilmOn X violated 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) be-
cause the statute is broad enough to encompass making “programs
available [performing] to any person with an internet-enabled de-
vice [publicly].”91  The court did not agree that FilmOn X’s posi-
tion was similar to an individual user hooking up an antenna on his
roof because of FilmOn X’s ability to amass the antennas under one
roof and distribute.92
D. Cablevision: Aereo’s Crutch & Achilles
1. Cablevision I 93
a. Cable Television Services Overview
Transmission of the cable company’s programming content is
fairly straight forward; with content transmitted from content
owner, through the cable company, to consumer.94  Video-on-de-
86. See id. at 1144 (“[The Copyright Act] does not require ‘performance’ of
performance.”).
87. See id. at 1145.
88. 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013).
89. See FilmOn X, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 34–37 (no consent or licensing agree-
ments involved).
90. See id. at 34 (“They also agree that the Aereo courts and BarryDriller court
described the technology and services accurately.”).
91. See id. at 46–47. The District of Massachusetts has disagreed in noting that
there would be no need for Congress to say “‘a performance or display of the work’”
if every transmission of an original performance was infringement. See Hearst Sta-
tions, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38–39 (D. Mass. 2013) (emphasis
added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).  However, the court did believe there was evi-
dence of volition to fall under the reproduction right. See id. at 39–40 (noting
reproduction “is a closer question than the issue of public performance”).  Alter-
natively, the District of Utah countered, arguing Aereo clearly met the definition
of CATV that was meant to fall under the transmit clause. See Cmty. Television of
Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1200 (D. Utah 2014).  The court
noted that Aereo’s reliance on Cablevision II overlooked that those facts established
a cable company which had paid licenses already. See id. at 1201.
92. See id. at 47–48 (noting also the complex system was still “ ‘device or pro-
cess’” under 17 U.S.C. § 101).
93. 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
94. See id. at 610.  Modern television is transmitted over “digital signals,”
which allow for more content to be “compressed” into a single “space.”  See id.  The
quality of the sound and picture transmitted through digital transmission is supe-
14
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mand (VOD) enhances the playing field by letting a consumer de-
cide when he or she will watch their programs.95  Digital-video-
recording (DVR) continued the progression by copying VOD’s re-
corded content onto a physical hard drive at the consumer’s
home.96  The physical hard-drive is often combined with a cable
box and placed inside the cable box housing; this box combination
is known as a “‘set-top storage DVR[ ]’ (‘STS-DVR[ ]’).”97
rior to the older analog television, which received its signals through a “series of
continuous waves.”  See id.  Specifically, the transmission of cable television (digi-
tally) begins with the “programming owners” who send “content feeds” to the
cable company.  See id.  The cable companies gather all of the feeds at a central
location.  See id. (noting that central location is where most equipment required to
keep a cable system running is stored).  To transmit the feeds for linear channels,
the feed is formatted into one “‘aggregated programming stream’ (‘APS’).”  See id.
A customer of linear programming receives the APS in his or her home by a device
that changes the digital signals of the feed into “radio frequency (‘RF’) signals.”
See id. at 611 (noting that radio signals are “better suited for transmission along a
cable system’s coaxial cable lines”).  The RF signals are transmitted across the main
cable system, which then bounces the RF signals to the “smaller cable systems” that
branch off of the main cable system.  See id.  The RF signals then end up at the
consumer’s home set-top box (by the smaller cable systems) where the APS con-
tent is sorted and “reassembled into a single program transport stream [(PTS)].”
See id.  So as to not give every channel to every consumer (i.e. no HBO for every-
one), the PTS content is encrypted.  See id.  Thus, when the set-top box receives the
packets it has “decryption hardware,” which sorts the content accordingly.  See id.
The content is then “decoded, and displayed,” after being decrypted.  See id.
95. See id. at 611.  As opposed to watching (linear) television programming
during its specific time slot, a Cable company also allows customers to watch a
linear program (ex. an episode of a FX show) outside of the timed programming
of regular, linear television.  See id.  This service, “Video-on-Demand (‘VOD’),”
which customers must purchase separately, allows the customer to select his or her
desired program through an “on-screen menu and [TV] remote control.”  See id.
While the customer can select the show from a menu of options, it is the cable
company that decides which shows are included in this menu.  See id. (noting that
cable company must have licenses to include content in menu).  After the license
agreements are established, the cable company is allowed to store the VOD menu
content on computers at its central location.  See id.  Because the linear program-
ming is already taking up the whole stream, a second stream must be used, along
with a “‘reverse’ channel [stream] for each customer.”  See id.  The reverse channel
is needed for the customer to pick and control (“rewind, fast-for-ward, and pause”)
which shows he or she desires to watch on the VOD menu service.  See id.
(“[P]layback control[s] are known as ‘trick modes.’”).
96. See id.  Whereas a VCR copies the content from the television signal onto
the videocassette inside of the VCR, a DVR copies the content onto a physical
hard-drive.  See id. (noting VCRs were placed in homes around 25 years ago while
DVRs gained popularity in 1999).
97. See id. at 611–12 (stating STS-DVR can copy digital content and does not
have to decode the stream; some STS-DVRs work by providing customers a “tuner”
that allows watching programs and a tuner that allows recording programs, verses
recording at the same time).  Like the VOD service, the STS-DVR uses a menu
from which the customer can record a selected program, which is copied onto the
physical hard-drive and is able to be replayed.  See id. (storage space is determined
by physical hard-drive’s capacity which cable provider determines).
15
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b. Cablevision’s Technology
While similar STS-DVR technology was used in Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp. (“Cablevision I”), un-
like an STS-DVR, Cablevision used an “RS-DVR,” which is a
“network DVR (‘nDVR’).”98  In Cablevision I, nDVR did not store the
copied recordings on a physical hard drive at the customer’s house,
but on a computer server at a central location owned by Cablevi-
sion.99  Importantly, the RS-DVR is not a single “piece of equip-
ment” like the STS-DVR, but involves around-the-clock human
interaction and maintenance.100  What the customer can and can-
not record was determined by Cablevision.101  Cablevision allowed
all of its 170 channels to be recordable.102
From Cablevision’s perspective, in order for Cablevision’s serv-
ers to be ready to record any of its 170 channels on a customer’s
whim, the content of those 170 channels are temporarily stored in
multiple “‘buffer’” zones.103  From the customer’s perspective,
98. See id. at 612.  Cablevision sold its own STS-DVRs, which could only record
linear programming that the customer was currently paying for. See id. In other
words, there was no ability for the customer to use the STS-DVR to record VOD
content. See id.
99. See id. An RS-DVR is also different from an STS-DVR because the RS-DVR
does not copy the content to a physical box in the customer’s home. See id.  The
RS-DVR is more than just a remote control, “on-screen program guide” (that
stored content at Cablevision’s central location), and a set-top box at the cus-
tomer’s house. See id.  It was also (a) “‘a network of wires, relays, switches, and RF
devices connecting the set-top box . . . to Cablevision’s cable television system,’”
and (b) “computer hardware and software located at Cablevision [i.e. central loca-
tions].” See id.
The recorded content that the consumer stored on Cablevision’s in-house
servers was created by Arroyo Video Solutions, Inc. and had numerous physical
hard drives with which to store the customer’s content.  See id. However, all the
customers’ content was not stored on the same hard-drive in one big file, but the
content was stored on that customer’s individually allotted hard-drive space (i.e.
individual folders within a big file).  See id. Once the customer chose to record a
program the program would be stored on Cablevision’s hard-drives “indefinitely,”
unless the customer deleted it or it was automatically deleted off of the hard-drive
server because the customer recorded a new program and the customer’s space
was full.  See id.
100. See id. Put in perspective, Cablevision’s expert estimated that around
“ten ‘boxes’” would be involved for each server created by Arroyo. See id. at 613.
Likewise, the expert stated that a Cablevision RS-DVR customer would not be al-
lowed to touch the RS-DVR “service,” which took-up more than a 60 feet by 60 feet
room at the central location.  See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 613–14 (noting that “ ‘buffer’ memory” is a form of “random
access memory—RAM”).  There are two buffer zones; the main buffer zone was
present when Cablevision’s servers received the streams of programming content.
See id. at 614.  The RS-DVR travels began (like cable) with a smaller circuit system
called the “BarcoNet,” which receives the “aggregated programming stream”
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss1/4
2016] AEREO III:  STOP BASHING BREYER 165
while either watching a program or finding the program on the
menu program guide, the customer can use the remote to start re-
cording a show within his or her subscription.104  For each cus-
tomer that requests a recording, their own, separate copy is copied
onto a secondary buffer zone, which then makes a “complete copy”
of that content onto the physical hard drive that Cablevision has set
aside on its server for that customer.105  Once the content is on
(“APS”). See id. at 613.  For linear programming, an APS would travel from Bar-
coNet; however, for RS-DVR the APS is separated from the BarcoNet into two dif-
ferent streams.  See id. at 613.  The “Big Band Broadband Multimedia Router
(‘BMR’)” receives the second stream and “clamp[s]” the second stream into a “va-
riable bitrate (‘VBR’)” stream, which is “more efficient.” See id. When the BMR
clamps it places part of the content into “‘buffer’ memory,” which is the first
buffer zone. See id. Different from regular cable streaming, the BMR also sepa-
rates out the APS into streams that only carry one channel per stream. See id. The
packets in these APSs are transformed by the BMR into “larger packets known as
User Datagram Protocol (‘UDP’),” which are given a “port number” that matches
the television channel that the single channel stream is meant for. See id. The
UDPs are transported via stream to “‘switch[es],’” which send the stream from
“one port to another” until being fed into the Cablevision servers.  See id. at
613–14.
Importantly, the buffering of content to the buffer zone occurs (“automati-
cally”) when the content was fed into Cablevision’s servers from the BMR, before
any customer started to the record the programming.  See id. at 614 (defining this
main buffer zone as the “‘primary ingest buffer’”).  However, this main buffer
zone can only hold the “equivalent of . . . three frames of video” at a time.  See id.
(noting that the primary ingest buffer can only hold 6,000 packets at once, which
is only “three frames of video”).
104. See id. Behind the scenes, that record action is sent to the “‘Application
Data Server’ (‘ADS’),” which is located at Cablevision’s central location (“head-
end”).  See id. The ADS checks to make sure the content is within the customer’s
subscription, the content is not already being recorded, there is enough hard-drive
space, and the customer is not trying to record two programs at once.  See id. After
the ADS finds or gets the requested content an “‘asset ID,’” so that the content has
an identifier for Cablevision’s server, the content is sent to the ‘‘‘Vitria’ server.” See
id. at 615.  The ADS gets an ID for the content by communicating with the “‘Ora-
cle Production Server’ (‘OPRD’).” See id. at 614. The OPRD is responsible for
keeping track of what has been requested by the customer for recording by “main-
tain[ing] a list of programs.”  See id. The OPRD will already have an asset ID for
the content if the customer has previously recorded the content. See id. If the
customer has not previously requested this content, then the ADS will ask the “‘As-
set Management and Publishing System’ (‘AMP’)” to create an asset ID for the
content. See id. After the AMP has sent the ADS the new asset ID, the ADS will
inform the OPRD of the new ID.  See id. at 614–15.  The OPRD then adds the new
ID to its list of “waiting to be recorded” content. See id. at 615.  Meanwhile, the
ADS has informed the Vitria server of the asset ID.  See id.
The Vitria server will then hold those recording requests until the content is
set to be recorded.  See id.  When the content is about to be recorded, the Vitria
server sends the list to Cablevision’s server.  See id.  When Cablevision’s server re-
ceives the list of recorded requests from the Vitria server, Cablevision’s server goes
to the primary ingest buffer zone and copies the content onto the “secondary in-
gest buffer” zone.  See id.
105. See id. (“For instance, if 1000 customers want to record a specific episode
of HBO’s ‘The Wire,’ 1000 separate copies of that episode are made, each copy
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Cablevision’s server, the customer has almost complete “playback”
control, yet the customer cannot copy the content from Cablevi-
sion’s server (which houses physical hard drives) to his or her own
physical hard drive (or VCR equivalent).106
The playback system works very similarly to the recording sys-
tem.107  When customers wish to playback content, they also select
the content program from an on-screen list with their remote con-
trol.108  This customer request asks their home set-top box to con-
verse with the Cablevision servers and the server finds the content
that is already copied on the customer’s set-aside hard drive space
and streams that content into “buffer memory.”109  The customer
can then use the trick modes to “pause, fast-forward, and rewind
the program,” which is accomplished by the RS-DVR “automatically
plac[ing] one to two seconds worth of video data from the pro-
gramming stream into buffer memory.”110
c. Procedure
Two consolidated cases were involved, with both plaintiffs seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief to stop Cablevision from debut-
ing its RS-DVR, as Cablevision did not pay for any licenses in order
to retransmit plaintiffs’ copyrighted material.111  Interestingly, the
plaintiffs stipulated to only arguing that Cablevision was directly in-
fringing their copyright (versus indirectly) and Cablevision agreed
to waive its defense that its use of the copyrighted material was a
uniquely associated by identifiers with the set-top box of the requesting customer.
Once a copy of the program is made to the customer’s hard drive, the [Cablevision
server] initiates a series of messages to inform the other components of the RS-
DVR that the program has been recorded, is available for playback, and should
appear as such on the customer’s on-screen program guide.” (citations omitted)).
Note that the “complete copy” of the content that is downloaded from the secon-
dary ingest buffer zone to Cablevision’s hard drive does not occur if the customer
does not request for the content to be recorded. See id. (noting that “portions” of
the content is still waiting in the buffer zones regardless of whether customer
records the content or not).
106. See id. (noting that customer could do this if Cablevision server hard
drive was replaced with customer’s in-house “set-top DVR”).
107. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
108. See Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 616.
111. See id. at 616, 618.
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“‘fair use.’”112  Both sides were seeking summary judgment after
filing cross-motions.113
d. Copyright Analysis: RS-DVR Transmissions Were Public
Performances
As the Copyright Act of 1976 only allows owners of copyrighted
works to “reproduce . . . copies” of their original copyrighted work
and to “perform . . . publicly” those copyrighted works, plaintiffs
argued that Cablevision was violating both of these “exclusive”
rights.114  Infringing another’s copyright requires the showing of
“‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized copying
or a violation of one of the other exclusive rights afforded copyright
owners [e.g. performing the work publicly].’”115
The plaintiffs argued that Cablevision was infringing their
right to reproduce and publicly perform their work.116  The court
found that Cablevision directly infringed both rights because of
Cablevision’s temporary storage of content in its buffer zones, and
the complexity of the RS-DVR, which made Cablevision an active,
direct infringer.117  Under the court’s “public performance” analy-
112. See id. at 616 (noting also that Cablevision had agreed not to released its
RS-DVR service until court ruled on issue in this case).
113. See id. (noting, after “limited discovery,” hearing, and oral argument,
that court was allowed to determine: witness credibility, findings on expert testi-
mony, and sufficiency of record; these determinations would allow court to rule-
unless there was disputed issue of material fact).
114. See id. at 617 (quoting Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and (4)
(2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that neither side argued that
plaintiffs did not own valid copyrights on televised content).
115. See id. (quoting Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
116. See id. at 617.
117. See id. at 618, 622.  In arguing against infringing on the reproductive
right of the plaintiffs, Cablevision asserted that it merely provided the equipment for
its customer to use in recording the program and, thus, Cablevision was not di-
rectly “ ‘doing’” the infringing.  See id. at 617–18 (noting that Cablevision believed
it was simply providing “a machine” and was “entirely passive” in the copying pro-
cess).  Cablevision compared its RS-DVR to a “VCR, STS-DVR, [and] a photo-
copier.”  See id. at 617.  The critical question for the court was how involved
Cablevision was with the supposed recording that the customer was doing when he
or she pushed the record button via his or her remote control.  See id. at 618.
Cablevision argued it was not involved at all—beyond selling the RS-DVR ability to
the customer—but the court disagreed and sided with the plaintiff.  See id. at 617.
The court disagreed with Cablevision’s proposition that the RS-DVR was
equivalent to a piece of equipment.  See id. at 618 (Cablevision believed that the
most the plaintiffs could prove was indirect infringement, but, of course, the plain-
tiffs waived this right).  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, who define the RS-
DVR as providing a “service.”  See id. In the court’s eyes, an example of a true piece
of equipment is a “Betamax VCR” (“B-VCR”), which was at issue in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  See id. (discussing Sony Corp.).
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The B-VCR was sold by Sony to customers who could use the B-VCR to “time-
shift[ ]” television programming.  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (rec-
ognizing time-shifting is “the practice of recording a program to view it at a later
time, then erasing it”).  Cablevision believed its RS-DVR was analogous to Sony’s B-
VCR; however, the court found multiple differences between the two, emanating
from Cablevision’s overt involvement.  See id. (noting Court in Sony found Sony to
have a fair use defense, which Cablevision waived here).
The B-VCR is a single piece of equipment that customers buy once, own, and
can connect it to whatever television they want and start recording.  See id.  The RS-
DVR is not a “single piece of equipment,” it has to connect to a certain customer’s
television, and cannot be moved.  See id. The B-VCR will start recording when the
customer pushes the record button with his or her remote control.  See id. Pushing
record on the RS-DVR started the relay of information that involved software, com-
puters, and other “devices” at Cablevision’s central location property.  See id. With
the B-VCR, the customers involvement with Sony was buying their product; versus
Cablevision which gave the set-top box to the customer, chose the programs that
the customer could record and how much memory the customer was afforded to
record on, provided the copyrighted content through its channels, kept the
software and equipment needed to deliver the content up and running, housed
the equipment on its land, and hired people to oversee the transfer of content-to
name a few.  See id. at 618–19 (reiterating that Sony was involved in no way after
the point of sale).
Cablevision wanted to argue that its “ongoing participation” was equivalent to
an STS-DVR, which was not a problem because a “programmer” or “cable opera-
tor” had never sued Cablevision for the STS-DVRs.  See id. at 619.  Because the STS-
DVR is distinguishable from the RS-DVR, which Cablevision was being sued for,
the court quickly dispensed with this argument as irrelevant.  See id. Specifically,
the court noted that the two were different because the STS-DVR recorded to a
physical hard drive which was at the customer’s house, often in the set-top box
casing; whereas, the RS-DVR required a second APS stream (apart from the origi-
nal linear channel stream). See id.
The court held the RS-DVR system to be more analogous to a “modified VOD
platform,” which Cablevision paid licensing fees to use. See id. (noting the system
itself and how it delivered content to be analogous). That is, the RS-DVR was only
allowed to record that which Cablevision allows, the content available for record-
ing was stored at Cablevision’s central location and not at the customer’s house,
both needed a “‘session resource manager’” to stream the content to the cus-
tomer. See id. (recognizing this streamed content is encrypted so only the cus-
tomer’s set-box can read it, and if no stream avenue is available the customer does
not receive the content he or she requested).
Cablevision argued that the copies stored in the buffer zones, in anticipation of a
customer recording a program, were not infringing on the plaintiffs’ copyrights
because they were not “copies,” were “not fixed,” and were only a small part of the
overall content (i.e. three frames at a time).  See id. at 621 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The court was not persuaded.  See id. at 622.  Precedent had estab-
lished that temporary storage of “information” on RAM (Random Access Memory)
was a Copyright Act copy.  See id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assoc., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998), Triad
Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995), MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993), Marobie-FL.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177–78 (N.D. Ill.
1997)).
Additionally, while only “portions” of the content were stored at any given
time in the buffer zone, (a) all portions would pass through the buffer zone, and
(b) all portions would form the entire program of content (show or movie) for the
customer to record.  See id. Notably, the Senate Report for the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act agreed that “buffer copies” were “fixed” according to the Copyright
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sis, Cablevision agreed it was “performing” by streaming the con-
tent to the customer.118  Cablevision admitted this, but argued it
was “passive in [the streaming] process” and therefore not directly
infringing.119  The court dismissed Cablevision’s passive-argument
because of Cablevision’s direct involvement in transmitting the con-
tent to the customer.120
After losing the performance argument, Cablevision then ar-
gued that the performance was not streaming to the “public.”121
Cablevision argued its streaming was not public because the per-
formances were “private,” as each customer received his or her own
copy of the content.122  The court disagreed.123  The court noted
that the Copyright Act did not require the viewers of the content to
be watching it together or even at the “same time.”124  The court
Act.  See id. at 621–22 (skimming over that Digital Millennium Copyright Act de-
fined buffer copies this way only if “they exist for a sufficient amount of time to be
capable of being copies, perceived or communicated” (emphasis added) (citing
DMCA Report at xxii, 110–11)).
118. See id. at 622.  See supra note 107–10 and accompanying text for an ex-
planation of Cablevision’s act of transmission.
119. See Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining
performance as, “to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying
it audible”).
120. See Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (noting that if customers hit
record, there would be no transmission without Cablevision’s facilitation).  “The
customer’s command triggers the playback process, but again, it is Cablevision and
its operation of an array of computer servers at the [central location] that actually
make the retrieval and streaming of the program possible.” See id.  The court also
rejected Cablevision’s passive arguments in Cablevision’s reproduction defense.
See supra note 117.
121. See id. at 622 (arguing that—because each consumer received a “distinct
copy”—it was privately streaming).
122. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting customers may not
view content in their homes, but that is where Cablevision “intended” the customer
to view the content).  The copyright act defines public performance as, “(1) to
perform or display [the work] at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a perform-
ance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (second
definition is defined as “ ‘transmit clause’”).
123. 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (holding argument to be “flawed”).
124. See id. at 622–23 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (“To transmit . . . to the
public . . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the perform-
ance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.”).
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held Cablevision to fit this definition perfectly.125  The court also
held Cablevision’s transmissions were public because Cablevision’s
relationship with its customers was “commercial” in nature.126
Cablevision’s individual transmissions, while occurring in private
homes, were sent to numerous people based on a payment transac-
tion; thus, Cablevision performed publicly.127
2. Cablevision II128
a. Background
Cablevision appealed the District Court’s opinion, which found
it to be directly infringing the appellees’ rights under the Copyright
Act.129
b. Take Two: Cablevision’s Transmission is a Performance, but
is not Public
The Second Circuit’s public performance analysis boiled down
to whether Cablevision’s playback transmission was the transmission
of a public performance.130  Only the Transmit Clause of the public
performance definition was implicated when the court asked
whether Cablevision was publicly transmitting a performance.131
125. See id. at 623 (“Cablevision would transmit the same program to mem-
bers of the public, who may receive the performance at different times, depending
on whether they view the program in real time or at a later time as an RS-DVR
playback.”).
126. See id.  The court notes that precedent has found neither watching copy-
righted content in privately rented hotel rooms, nor “private viewing booths” in
rental stores, as private performances since the nature of the viewing was commer-
cial. See id. (citing On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F.
Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991), Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,
749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also supra notes 65–68 and accompanying
text.
127. See id. at 623–24.  Cablevision has “discretion over what content was avail-
able to customers, the customer selected the programming he or she wished to
view; the service provider supplied the content from one location to another loca-
tion for the customer’s exclusive viewing; and the service provider supplied the
same content to other customers at different times.” See id.
128. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter Cablevision II].
129. See id. at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Second Circuit
reminded its readers that Cablevision did have “numerous licensing agreements”
with the appellees. See id.
130. See id. at 134.  See supra note 122 for the full Copyright Act definition of a
public performance.
131. See id. (noting Cablevision agreed RS-DVR “playback” was “transmission
of a performance of a work”).  The Second Circuit phrases the buffer zone issue as
whether Cablevision’s buffer zone, which stored data, was “reproduc[ing]” a copy
of that work.  See id. at 127.  As noted above, part of the definition of a “copy” is
that it is “fixed,” which requires that “the work must be embodied in a medium”
22
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and that the work “must remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transi-
tory duration.’”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  See supra notes 57– 58
for the specific Copyright Act definitions.  The Second Circuit held the District
Court to be confused when it found that the buffer zone copies were fixed because
the District Court combined the separate fixed analyses.  See id. The District Court
combined these analyses by holding that—because the content was embodied in
the buffer zone—the content remained embodied for a sufficient period of time.
See id.
The Second Circuit argued that this was a misreading of the Copyright Act, as
it would make language found in the “fixed” definition, “ ‘for a period of more
than transitory duration,’” irrelevant.  See id. at 127, 129 (disagreeing with copy-
right office, and giving lower level of deference, which held that “any amount of
time” is enough for content to be fixed).  The Second Circuit disagreed with the
District Court’s citing of MAI Systems because the case did not address, and did not
need to address, the “duration requirement,” as the software was admitted to be
held on the RAM for a satisfactory duration.  See id. at 127–28 (dealing with
whether person who loaded computer with software in order to fix the computer
was creating copy of that software, which had to be processed on the computer’s
RAM).  In order for the software to process, the software’s time spent on the com-
puter’s RAM must have been “several minutes.”  See id. at 128.
Likewise, the court did not need to address whether a few minutes was
enough time as no one seemed to debate it. See id. Thus, the Second Circuit read
MAI Systems only “as holding that loading a program into a computer’s RAM can
result in copying that program,” not that it “always” does. See id. Applying both
analyses to Cablevision, the Second Circuit found “‘embodiment’” because the
buffer zones were “‘stable’” enough for the content to “‘be perceived, [or] repro-
duced.’”  See id. at 129 (noting even though content was only placed in buffer zone
in small increments, whole work still passed through zone and, thus, was embod-
ied).  However, because the content only lasts “a fleeting 1.2 seconds” before it was
“automatically overwritten” with the next content fragment, the court did not be-
lieve this was enough time to be considered ‘non-transitory.’”  See id. at 129–30.
Hence, the buffer zone content is not a copy because it is not fixed.  See id. at 130
(noting court will not touch whether “copies produced by buffering data would
be” too small to be considered copies).
After the recorded content was requested by the customer, a copy of that
“complete copy” would be stored on Cablevision’s server for that customer unless
deleted by the customer or automatically deleted by Cablevision.  See id. Cablevi-
sion would automatically delete content to make room on the limited hard drive
for more content. See id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.  The ques-
tion was who was the creator of this copy, Cablevision or the customer.  See id.
Unlike the District Court, the Second Circuit believed that the distinction between
direct and contributory liability was important to understand how the court’s anal-
ysis should be applied.  See id. at 130–31.  The Second Circuit found that direct
infringement needed a purposeful action (i.e. “direct” link) by the infringer, or
the distinction was non-existent.  See id.
The court discussed supporting precedent which did not want to impose lia-
bility for direct infringement on an Internet service provider (“ISP”) when the
ISP’s system “automatically reproduced” a copyrighted work that had been
uploaded by a user. See id. at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Relig-
ious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commuc’n Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)) (noting direct infringement use to be strict liability concern).  There-
fore, the court in Religious Technology wanted the infringer to show willingness, a
choice, to infringe, which was not present in automatic reproduction of a work. See
id. The Second Circuit also noted that the Fourth Circuit endorsed Religious Tech-
nology by requiring a showing of “actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently
close and causal to the illegal copying.” See id. (emphasis added) (quoting CoStar
Group., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)).  While the Dis-
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Cablevision argued that the customer performed by imitating the
playback function, and the performance was not public, but pri-
vate.132  However, the court did not address the first, as it found the
latter dispositive.133
In its analysis, the court began with the plain language of the
statute, which does not define “to the public.”134  However, the
phrase is contextualized by the Copyright Act noting that transmis-
sion to the public is not limited by whether the “members of the
public capable of receiving the performance” are together or apart
trict Court found cases dealing with the causal connection problem and Internet
service providers (“ISP”) to be distinguishable because of the Internet’s “ ‘unique
attributes,’” the Second Circuit disagreed.  See id. at 131 (noting District Court’s
“pigeon-hol[ing]” of Religious Technology). The court disagreed because the under-
lying issue of causal conduct “transcend[s] the Internet.”  See id.
Thus, the court focused on Cablevision’s conduct that could link it as a direct
infringer, its creation and maintenance of its system that placed a complete copy
on its server, versus the conduct of the customer in “ordering” the copy.  See id.
(noting VCR example obviously put the causal act on the customer who pushed
the record button, but also noting that RS-DVR use was not too different).  The
court found that Cablevision was similar to a Staples, for example, that allows the
customer to make his or her copies with a photocopier found in Staples.  See id.
(holding that the District Court’s focus on “‘instrumental’” involvement versus
“‘incidental’” could be said of VCR or photocopier).
Just as Staples is not a direct infringer, neither is Cablevision.  See id.  Interest-
ingly, the District Court thought that Cablevision was not Staples (“store proprie-
tor”) but the employee at Staples that is asked to make copies of the copyrighted
material. See id. at 131–32. However, the Second Circuit noted that this analogy
breaks down because the Staples’ employee is making a direct act of infringement,
whereas Cablevision’s system “automatically obeys [the customer’s] commands.”
See id. at 131.  The more proper analogy: the customer is the Staples’ employee.
See id. at 132 (stating that even though Cablevision chose which content its custom-
ers could record, while that conduct was “more proximate . . . [than] operating an
ISP or opening a copy shop,” link was still too attenuated for direct infringement).
In denying a causal link, the court honed in on the fact that while Cablevision did
decide which channels could be recorded by the customer, it could not determine
which content (e.g. shows) on those channels could be recorded; therefore, hav-
ing “less control” over RS-DVR recording than VOD recording. See id. The court
concluded these points by noting the importance and need for the distinction
between direct and contributory infringement. See id. at 132–34 (leaving for an-
other day the question of whether contributory infringer can become direct in-
fringer based on quality and quantity of involvement in that contributory
infringement).
132. See id. at 134.
133. See id.  The court noted that just because it found Cablevision as the
“copier” did not mean it would find Cablevision as the “performer.” See id. (“[W]e
note that our conclusion in Part II that the customer, not Cablevision, ‘does’ the
copying does not dictate a parallel conclusion that the customer, and not Cablevi-
sion, ‘performs’ the copyrighted work.”).  The court noted that the reproduction
right and public performance right are very different. See id. (“For example, the
statute defines the verb ‘perform’ and the noun ‘copies,’ but not the verbs
‘reproduce’ or ‘copy.’”).  See id. See supra note 131 for the court’s analysis of the
reproduction right.
134. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134.
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when they receive it, nor whether they view the transmission at “the
same time or at different times.”135  The court read “‘capable of
receiving’” and “‘capable of receiving the performance,’” as indi-
cating that the public must be receiving the transmission to be part
of “to the public,” and any transmission of the original perform-
ance is a performance.136
The court agreed with Cablevision that the RS-DVR’s transmis-
sion of one copy per customer, only decodable by that customer’s
set-top box, was important to the Transmit Clause analysis.137  The
court did not agree with the plaintiff (and District Court) that “to
the public” insinuated a “larger potential audience,” thus, the court
would not focus on all customers with RS-DVRs, nor all customers
with RS-DVRs who recorded the same content.138  The court noted
that if the plaintiff was correct, “to the public” would be superfluous
language because every transmission would reach a “potential audi-
ence.”139  Thus, Cablevision was only transmitting the one copy to
one person, which was not transmission “to the public.”140
135. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra note 122 for the full Copyright Act definition of a public performance.
136. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134–35 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at
64–65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678; H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, at 29
(1967)) (giving deference to legislative history of 1976 House Report and 1967
House Report, which noted the importance of the two phrases).
137. See id. at 135.
138. See id. at 135–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that fol-
lowing the District Court would be focusing on transmission of the content (“work”)
when the plain language draws focus to the transmission itself).  The court also
rejected the plaintiff’s spin on the court’s refutation by arguing that the Copyright
Act’s use of the word “performance” means “‘original’ performance,” thus, requir-
ing an analysis of a broader spectrum of the public because all transmissions of an
original are an original performance. See id. at 136.
The court rejected this because it believed the act was punishing the transmit-
ter (i.e. Cablevision) for transmitting a copy, and the plaintiff’s theory would allow
the transmitter to be punished for another transmitter’s copy. See id. For example,
two transmitters are given the same content, one transmits legally (among itself)
and another transmits to customers. See id. (court uses HBO, Cablevision, and
Comcast).  The legal transmitter would still be liable for the illegal transmission to
the customers because the content is the same, even though the legal transmitter
did not do the illegal transmitting. See id. (stating that these results would be
absurd).
139. See id. at 135–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting also that
the Copyright Act says “ ‘performance,’” not “‘work’”).
140. See id. at 137 (noting that plaintiffs’ argument—that singling out the cop-
ies makes no difference—has not been supported by plaintiffs).  The court distin-
guished PrimeTime 24 as finding a public performance at every stage of
transmission only because the final transmission was a public performance. See id.
at 136–37; see also infra text accompanying notes 77–80 (discussing PrimeTime 24).
Likewise, the court held Redd to support its contention that in order for a perform-
ance to be transmitted it must be the “same copy.” See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at
138; see also infra text accompanying notes 65– 68 (discussing Redd).  The Second
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III. THE NARRATIVE: AEREO’S LONG JOURNEY
A. Aereo’s Technology
From the Aereo consumer’s perspective, after subscribing to
Aereo, the user could select television programs that were airing, or
would air, from an online-interface.141  The user could either watch
the airing programs with a delay online, or record the program for
later viewing.142  A copy would only be stored if the user recorded
the program.143  In either instance, the user could pause or rewind
the program.144  The District Court compared Aereo to a “remotely
located DVR” that streamed over the Internet instead of over
cable.145
From Aereo’s “perspective,” when the user selected “Watch,”
“Aereo’s Application Server” received a request and then sent this
request (with user information) to “Aereo’s Antenna Server.”146
The Antenna Server would assign the user his or her own antenna
and transcoder to receive the Internet stream of the television pro-
gram.147  If the user was “static” then the user received only an-
tenna-X every time he or she requested that Aereo play or record a
Circuit also found the argument that any transmission for profit is a public trans-
mission as “untenable.” See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 139 (citing On Command
Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
141. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
[hereinafter Aereo I].  Originally, Aereo was limited to New York City users and
New York City area channels only. See WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d
Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Aereo II].
142. See Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (noting that if the user records the
program when the program is airing, then the user can watch nearly simultane-
ously to its recording).
143. See id.
144. See id. The fact that the Aereo system allowed its users to rewind and
pause supports the argument that Aereo was not sending them the original broad-
cast transmission, but a copy of that original that Aereo was storing until the user
was done watching the program.  See Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 692 n.15.  A second fact
that supports that Aereo used a copy is that if a user simply decided to “Watch” the
program, but in the middle of watching the program the user decided to hit “Re-
cord,” the program would be recorded from the beginning of the copy and not at
the time that the user hit “Record.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. A typical DVR travels through cable
and requires another device to stream its content over the Internet (such as a
“Slingbox”). See id.
146. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Aereo’s antennas were dime
size and made of two square, metal loops. See id. at 379.  These antennas were
stuffed shoulder-to-shoulder, row-to-row onto a circuit board, which was housed in
a structure that also housed the encoder, which allowed the antennas to function.
See id. Filed away, sixteen boards were found parallel in that metal structure and
protruded out of the housing, so as to receive signals. See id.
147. See id. at 377.
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program.148  If the user was “dynamic” then he or she would still
only use one, individual antenna, but each time he or she requested
Aereo to play or record a program, Aereo could choose antenna-X,
antenna-Y, antenna-W, et cetera, to play or record the program.149
After the Antenna Server assigned the user, the server would
send a “‘tune’ request” that made the user’s specified antenna
“tune into” the program’s “particular broadcast frequency.”150  The
Antenna server also communicated with the “Streaming Server”
which recorded a “unique directory” for each user’s data that was
produced by his or her individual antenna and transcoder (“output
data”).151  This directory allowed the antenna to send an “electric
signal,” which was adapted into “data packets,” over the Internet.152
These packets proceeded to the Streaming Server, were saved on a
hard drive for later directory filing, and read into the RAM buffer
zone.153  This buffer zone then sent the program six-to-seven
seconds at a time to the user’s interface.154
B. Aereo I
1. Background Procedure (preliminary injunction)
Plaintiffs’ complaint argued that Aereo infringed copyright
holders’ rights of public performance, reproduction, and contribut-
ing to others’ infringement, when Aereo intercepted broadcast tele-
vision signals and sent them to their consumers’ Internet-
connected devices.155  The complaints were limited by plaintiffs ask-
ing the court for a preliminary injunction against Aereo for direct
copyright infringement of the public performance right.156  The
148. See id. at 377–78 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Note antenna-X is
an example.
149. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that most of Aereo
users were “dynamic”).  Importantly, two users would never use the same antenna
at the same time. See id. at 378.  Neither would a user’s data be accessible by an-
other user.  See id. Note antenna-X, antenna-Y, and antenna-W are used as
examples.
150. See id. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See id. This means that the antenna was not directly streaming the con-
tent to the user, but streaming a copy from Aereo’s server. See Aereo II, 712 F.3d
676, 682 (2d Cir. 2013).
152. See Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
153. See id.  The hard drive did save a temporary copy of the program if the
user watched the program, or a stored copy if the user recorded. See id. at 377-78.
The buffer zone was re-writing over these packets every time new packets came in,
so it was not storing any data indefinitely. See id. at 377.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 375–76.
156. See id. at 376.  A preliminary injunction standard requires that the plain-
tiff will win on merits alone. See id.
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complaint was further limited to argue that only Aereo’s service,
which allowed its users to watch the televised programs at the same
time as the programs were televised, infringed.157
2. Disputed Facts
The only factual dispute between the parties was whether
Aereo’s antenna structure allowed the antennas to function individ-
ually.158  Importantly, if the antennas could not transmit individu-
ally, then the antenna structure would be acting as one giant
antenna, and not creating separate transmissions of the pro-
grams.159  Plaintiffs argued that the size of the dime antennas and
their crammed nature presented the incoming signal with “‘one
continuous piece of metal.’”160  Various tests were done that at-
tempted to isolate the small antennas and show that their size re-
quired the conglomerate structure in order for the signals to be
strong enough.161  However, the court sided with Aereo because
the opposing opinion arguments against Aereo were too vague to
allow Aereo to counter them.162
3. Analysis: Equivalent to Cablevision
Aereo argued that it was simply a provider of equipment and
that its system was an antenna/DVR/Slingbox “equivalent.”163
Aereo claimed a Cablevision-similar defense because its system pro-
157. See id.
158. See id. at 379.  This was important to the plaintiffs who sought to show
the court that Aereo’s tiny antennas were acting as one big antenna and, thus, not
sending individual copies. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
159. See Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 379–80.  Because smaller antennas do not have the “reach” that
larger antennas do, the plaintiffs’ Dr. Volakis testified that he believed the anten-
nas must be using each other, and surrounding metal, to increase their reach. See
id. at 379 (noting only alternative is for broadcast signal to be made stronger).  Dr.
Volakis tried various tests, for example, he focused on just one dime sized antenna
and turned off or suppressed the surrounding antennas, and introduced more
metal to the circuit board and did not see the reception rise or dip. See id. at
379–80.
162. See id. at 380.  Aereo noted that Dr. Volakis incorrectly positioned the
control board for his tests, which influenced signal strength; had no control group
in his experiments; used computer simulations in his analysis; could not explain
exactly how his experiments worked at his deposition; and could not explain how
he introduced more metal to the circuit board. See id.  These flaws with Dr. Volakis
and the inability for him to be cross-examined as an expert moved the District
Court to side with Aereo. See id. The Second Circuit noted that the District Court
had resolved the dispute of whether Aereo’s antennas operated independently or
as a conglomerate in Aereo’s favor.  See Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
163. See Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
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duced “unique, user-requested copies” that went only to that user
by a single antenna.164  CBS, on the plaintiffs’ side, argued that
Aereo was infringing the copyright owner’s right to perform the
work publicly by taking the broadcast signal in the first place.165
CBS did not believe Cablevision should be applied because it was fact
specific.166  Thus, Aereo argued that by taking the broadcast signal
and re-transmitting, Aereo created unique copies that were private
performances for each user.167  Conversely, CBS argued that simply
retransmitting the broadcast signal did not make unique copies,
but passed the original from person to person.168
Falling under Cablevision’s precedent, the District Court was
not persuaded by CBS’s arguments.169  The court noted that, just
like Cablevision’s system, Aereo’s system was triggered by the user,
made unique copies for the user, no other user was privy to another
user’s copy, and Aereo’s service was just a combination of equip-
ment that the user could purchase on his own.170  Likewise, any dis-
similarities were in Aereo’s favor; for example, Cablevision’s origi-
nal “stream of data” created all of the user copies while Aereo’s
copies were created from “separate stream[s].”171  The similarities
between Cablevision and Aereo were too great for the court to
ignore.172
Strategically, CBS took a different route in arguing that Cablevi-
sion was only applicable to “time shifting” (recording programs for
later viewing) whereas Aereo is allowing the user to watch the pro-
gram “live”- at only a slight delay.173  Because the court believed this
argument was based on “Cablevision’s silence,” the court was not
persuaded.174  Additionally, CBS conceded that Cablevision was si-






169. See id. (noting no difference between Cablevision’s system and Aereo’s).
170. See id. at 386 (noting Cablevision was basically DVR or VCR and Aereo’s
was DVR or Slingbox).
171. See id. at 387.
172. See id.
173. See id. (noting if there is “overlap” between broadcast and recorded pro-
gram then there is no time-shifting).
174. See id. at 388 (“[T]ime-shifting is simply not the basis of the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion.”).  “Thus, even accepting that a distinction based on time-shifting
exists in this case, nothing in the Second Circuit’s analysis indicates that this dis-
tinction is material, and this Court remains obligated to apply Circuit precedent
with fidelity to its underlying reasoning.” See id.
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to make live transmissions.”175  The court found this stipulation and
Cablevision’s focus on user-specific copies to make CBS’s point
moot.176  Time shifting was not dispositive because regardless of
whether one watched the program after it had aired (Cablevision)
or while the program was airing (Aereo), unique copies were made
in both instances.177
Cablevision did not define a public performance by the number
of people receiving the transmission.178  In fact, the opposite is true
because Cablevision followed the Copyright Act, which did not fo-
cus on whether the transmission was received at “ ‘the same time or
at different times.’”179  Practically this makes sense because if a pub-
lic performance occurred each time a transmission was made then
a paying customer could not use a Slingbox to send a recorded pro-
gram to his smartphone.180  Redundantly, CBS next argued that
“buffer copies,” which have been found to be infringing, were what
Aereo’s “Watch” service created.181  The court pointed again to how
the unique copies were more permanent than Internet buffer cop-
ies because Aereo’s server stored the show until the user was fin-
ished watching it.182
Finally, CBS tried to argue that Cablevision was wrong in plainly
reading the transmit clause and Aereo’s performance was a “‘quin-
tessential public performance.’”183  Aereo’s performance was quin-
tessential because it used a “device or process to communicate
performances of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted work to members of the
public.”184  The court noted that Cablevision rejected this argument
when it did not affirm the District Court, which argued the same
thing.185  Likewise, the plaintiffs could not explain how watching a
175. See id. at 388–89.
176. See id. at 389.  Even CBS’s argument that “time-shifting limits the poten-
tial audience” in Cablevision more so than in Aereo was rejected by the court as just
another conclusory statement.  See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 390.
179. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
180. See id.  “A Slingbox is a device that connects the user’s cable or satellite
set-top box or DVR to the internet, allowing the user to watch live or recorded
programs on an internet-connected mobile device, such as a laptop or tablet.” See
Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 680 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013).
181. See Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. See id. at 390–92.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 392–93.  The court also rejected CBS’s argument that the time-
shifting had to be “‘complete’” in order for infringement not to occur.  See id. at
393.  Because this argument was based on Sony Corporation of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which only discussed time-shifting in refer-
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recorded program a minute before its airing ends was public per-
formance, but watching the recorded program a minute after it had
fully aired was not a public performance.186
C. Aereo II
1. The Copyright Act of 1976’s Transmit Clause Interpretation
The 1976 amendment to the Copyright Act was intended to
include the Transmit clause in response to issues raised, prior to,
but covered in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Incorporated
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Incorporated.187
When Fortnightly Corp. and Teleprompter Corp were decided, the Copy-
right Act did not have a Transmit Clause, therefore, the Court natu-
rally found the re-transmission of broadcast television signals from
an antenna-through coaxial cable–to the user allowable.188  This
setup was not found to infringe the public performance right of the
copyright holders because there was no performance.189  Plaintiffs
argued that Aereo’s technology was the exact same concept only
technologized.190
2. Copyright Act of 1976’s Legislative Intent
The Plaintiffs ignored Congress’ own concerns when they as-
serted that the Aereo model was the same as the CATV model,
which Congress encapsulated in the 1976 amendment.191  Origi-
nally, Congress was concerned with how broadly “performance” was
defined.192  Congress limited the performance standard by requir-
ing that the performance be done publicly.193  Therefore, private
performances would not infringe.194  The court did note that deter-
mining between private and public was not as difficult in the 1970’s;
however, it felt that Congress’ limiting concerns took precedent.195
ence to fair use and reproduction infringement, the court viewed Sony’s argu-
ments as misstatements. See id.
186. See id. at 394.  Importantly, the court did not address whether “Aereo
escapes liability” because it did not begin the transmission process. See id. at 396.
187. See Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013).
188. See id.
189. See id. The court noted that Congress also created a “compulsory li-
cense” to encourage continual “investment in cable systems.” See id.
190. See id. at 686.
191. See id. at 694.
192. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 694–95.
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3. Following the District Court’s Lead
Under a Cablevision Analysis, the majority did not find Cablevi-
sion’s creation of “temporary buffer copies,” or its “permanent”
copies for each customer, as relevant to the question of whether
Cablevision publicly performed.196  The court did parse out exactly
what Cablevision had rejected as a definition for public perform-
ance.197  First, Cablevision rejected determining if a transmission was
public by looking at the “potential audience” of the “underlying
work,” instead of the “particular transmission.”198  This was rejected
because every work has a potential audience, therefore, Congress’
inclusion that the transmission must be “to the public” would be
superfluous.199
Second, Cablevision rejected taking all the transmission phases
of a performance and holding each phase to be a public perform-
ance.200  Practically, this would make individual users liable for re-
cording a program and transmitting it to their second television.201
The Cablevision court held that performing publicly was determined
by whether the original program was watched by multiple people
(“performed”), regardless of whether the people were watching at
different times or places.202
The Aereo II court found Cablevision produced four guidelines:
(1) “consider the potential audience of the individual transmis-
sion,” (2) “private transmission . . . should not be aggregated,” un-
less (3) the “private transmissions are generated from the same
copy of the work,” and (4) whether unique copies are made is rele-
vant to whether the performance is public because the potential
audience is limited.203  Hence, the court boiled down Cablevision
into: (a) unique copies were created at the behest of the user, and
(b) the transmission of the program was based on the unique copy
and not the original program stream.204  This meant that the trans-
missions were not public because only one user received each
196. See id. at 687.
197. See id.
198. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. See id. at 688 (assuming conglomerate actually reached users).
201. See id.
202. See id. at 688–89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. See id. at 689.
204. See id.
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one.205  Aereo’s system was exactly the same, so the court found
Cablevision to apply and be dispositive of plaintiff’s claim.206
Plaintiffs argued similarly as in District Court; however, their
Second Circuit focus was on Aereo’s equivalency to the cable televi-
sion provider.207  The plaintiffs argued that in Cablevision the focus
was on comparing the Cablevision RS-DVR system to a VCR, which
was not equivalent to Aereo’s system.208  The court dispensed with
this argument as the VCR comments did not appear relative to the
public performance discussion and, alternatively, the Second Cir-
cuit had already applied the VCR analogy to different technolo-
gies.209  Likewise, the court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs concern
that Aereo’s setup was designed because of Cablevision.210  The
court noted that this was simply a last ditch effort to argue that
Cablevision II was wrong.211
4. Judge Chin’s Dissent
Judge Chin viewed Aereo’s set-up as a “sham.”212  He saw no
reason why Aereo could not have used “one central antenna” other
than to skirt the law in making one performance for each user.213
Following this reasoning, Judge Chin also found Cablevision to be
distinguishable, as Cablevision paid licensing and retransmission
consent fees.214
a. The Copyright Act’s Plain Language
The dissent believed Aereo fell under a plain reading.215  First,
Aereo’s system of multiple antennas and transcoders falls under the
broad wording of a “ ‘any device or process.’”216  Second, Aereo’s
system took original, copyrighted work and retransmits them to
205. See id. at 689–70.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 691 (holding that Cablevision undermined plaintiffs’ arguing,
again, that “to the public” meant public could “receive” the retransmission, and
unique performances should be aggregated).
208. See id.
209. See id. (applying to internet music downloads) (citing United States v.
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2010)).
210. See Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 694.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).  Judge Chin held to his view when the
Second Circuit court denied rehearing en banc and he dissented. See WNET v.
Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 2013).
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 698.
216. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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users “ ‘beyond the place from which they are sent.’”217  Third, the
“‘performance’” was sent to users who could view it “ ‘in separate
places’ and ‘at different times.’”218  Finally, Chin believed the po-
tential audience argument should apply in making Aereo’s trans-
missions public, as a “transmission to anyone other than oneself or
an intimate relation is a communication to a ‘member[ ] of the
public,’ because it is not in any sense ‘private.’”219  This argument is
bolstered when the “anyone” includes “paying strangers.”220
b. Legislative History
Judge Chin agreed that the Transmit Clause is not “crystal”
clear.221  Yet, he believed the history was clear.222  Congress knew
that the Act would need to apply to new technologies.223  Congress
reacted to extremely similar situations with the cable system
cases.224  The cable system cases also involved the question of
whether a company who sells equipment that a user could buy was
infringing.225
Factually, Congress already “rejected” this rationale by passing
the 1976 amendment.226  Furthermore, Congress changed the defi-
nitions of “perform” and “publicly” to include these CATV systems
within the Act.227  Congress even noted that “transmit” would
change with the evolution of technology, and that public perform-
ance was not restricted to the same time and place.228  The dissent
admitted that Congress probably did not foresee Aereo, but Con-
gress cast a broad net that certainly applied to Aereo.229
c. Cablevision Distinguished
Notably, the dissent did not believe the reproduction rights
noted in Cablevision were inapposite to the public performance
217. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (that is, beyond where they were origi-
nally intended to go).
218. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
219. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kouichi Taniguchi v.
Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012)).
220. See id. at 699.
221. See id. (noting it is not clear as applied to Aereo type technologies).
222. See id.
223. See id. (noting that Congress “intended to reach new technologies”).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 700.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 701.
34
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss1/4
2016] AEREO III:  STOP BASHING BREYER 183
right because Cablevision’s right to retransmit was important to the
analysis.230  In other words, the majority is inadvertently discussing
the reproduction right when it points to the copies as proof that
private performances are occurring.231  Judge Chin’s divergence
from the majority on this point was important because he did not
believe Cablevision’s reproduction was equivalent to Aereo’s.232
His primary disagreements with the majority were two fold.233
First, Cablevision’s RS-DVR was to record, not watch an (almost)
equivalent “‘live’ broadcast.”234  Judge Chin viewed this as the dif-
ference between a secondary perk (the RS-DVR) and a purpose
(Aereo).235  This distinction should make Cablevision inapplicable
because the court was working under the assumption that Cablevi-
sion paid license fees and its RS-DVR system was simply an add-on
and not the whole show.236  This is in stark contrast to the Aereo
customer who wanted to “[w]atch” television “live” instead of solely
recording it.237  Ironically, this makes the “Record” function a sec-
ondary consideration for the consumer whereas the RS-DVR was
only being sold to record.238
Second, Aereo’s purpose made its recording system different
than Cablevision’s because when the Aereo user pressed “[w]atch”
a recording was made and stored for the length of the program.239
This is important, the Aereo user was not pressing a record button,
but was forced to indirectly record by Aereo’s model, which re-
corded incase the consumer wanted to take future action.240  The
only reason the recording took place was in case the user wanted to
use Aereo’s other functions later (rewind, pause, play, record).241
Because of this, Aereo is now the instigator of the recording copy of
its “Watch” function and not its user.242
230. See id.
231. See id. at 702.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. (noting that Aereo’s lack of retransmission license agreements is
especially important to this analysis).
235. See id. (insinuating that Aereo added “Record” as afterthought).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 702–03.
239. See id. at 703.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.  Judge Chin also believed Cablevision did not wish to extend be-
yond its own facts.  See id. Also, the dissent holds the majority opinion to ignore
other precedent, which held that Internet streaming was public performance. See
id. (citing WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2012) (streaming
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D. Aereo III
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Second
Circuit.243  While the issue remained the same, the Court broke the
issue into two parts: (1) is Aereo performing, and if Aereo is per-
forming, (2) is Aereo publicly performing.244
1. Majority: Aereo performs
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Court honed in on the Copy-
right Act’s historical context.245  The Court did not find the lan-
guage to be clear regarding whether a supplier of equipment is
performing or transmitting.246  Yet, historically, the Act was
amended to bring community antenna television (CATV) under its
purview.247  The Court focused on the rationale behind Congress’
attempt to include CATV within the Transmit Clause.248  In the case
law, CATV providers were found to be distinguishable from broad-
casters because the latter choose the programs and the former re-
ceived and transmitted the programs.249  Vital to the analysis, this
made CATV providers equivalent to “viewers” generally.250  Just as
viewers would not infringe by using “‘amplified equipment,’”
neither would CATV providers.251  Even though CATV providers
did have control over what they transmitted, the Court did not be-
lieve this was similar to the broadcaster’s ability to choose “what to
air.”252
The Copyright Act’s redefined terms created the Transmit
Clause which established that CATV similar entities must fall under
the Act.253  Aereo was the modern equivalent to the CATV sys-
television over Internet); United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, Pub-
lishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (streaming song)).
243. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (holding Aereo’s “complex
service” of near-simultaneous television viewing to infringe the Copyright Act of
1976).
244. See id. at 2504.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.
390, 392 (1968)).
248. See id.




253. See id. at 2505–06 (“The Clause makes clear that an entity that acts like a
CATV system itself performs, even if when doing so, it simply enhances viewers’
ability to receive broadcast television signals.”).
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tem.254  The majority did not agree with the dissent that the CATV
systems were distinguishable from Aereo because the CATV systems
“transmitted constantly” to the user’s television set.255  The majority
did not view the Aereo user selecting the content as distinguishable
either because CATV users could also select their content.256  The
similarities of Aereo and CATV systems were too overwhelming for
the majority to ignore.257  Thus, Aereo “performed” as defined by
the Copyright Act, based on the intent and history of the Copyright
Act of 1976.258
2. Majority: Aereo Performs Publicly
Moving to issue (2), the Court assumed for argument’s sake
that Aereo was transmitting a “new” performance when it transmit-
ted from its own copy.259  The Court granted this argument for
Aereo, but did not believe Aereo’s next argument—that each new
performance was private for each subscriber—flowed logically.260
Just because a new performance occurred each time a user watched
a program did not mean the new performance was private.261  The
jump in logic was apparent when one considers that if Aereo’s indi-
vidual antenna system was all that was needed to make a private
performance than CATV could just implement a similar system and
not be covered by the Act.262  This outcome is obviously contrary to
Congress’ objectives in the 1976 amendment.263  The Court rea-
soned that the Act’s use of “ ‘to transmit . . . a performance’” does
not insinuate only a “single transmission” because whether one is
254. See id. at 2506.
255. See id. at 2507.
256. See id. (CATV systems users “turned the knob”).  “But this difference
means nothing to the subscriber.  It means nothing to the broadcaster.  We do not
see how this single difference, invisible to the subscriber and broadcaster alike,
could transform a system that is for all practical purposes a traditional cable sys-
tem. . . .” See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 2508.  This is in opposition to the plaintiffs who argue that
Aereo was transmitting the original (“prior”) performance multiple times.  See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. (noting that congressional objectives trump “technological
differences”).
262. See id. at 2508–09. But see Max Hsu, Note, Private Performances for the Public
Good: Aereo and the Battle for Broadcast’s Soul, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 57, 68–69 (2014)
(disagreeing that sending one work to one person was to the public, as “the major-
ity succumbed to a red herring and missed the true crux of the dispute”).
263. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
37
Stirparo: Stop Bashing Breyer: How the Justice's Powerful Subtlety Out-Witt
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
186 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 149
telling a crowd of people a message or individually emailing each
one, a transmission of information has occurred.264
This is especially true when the Transmit Clause is applied be-
cause it does not require everyone to view the transmission at the
same time or in the same place.265  Further, its broad language of
using a “‘device or process’” encompasses multiple transmissions as
a process or through a single device.266  Also, practically speaking,
sending the same information to large groups of people must con-
stitute “to the public.”267  Ultimately, the Court found that Aereo
publicly performed and defined “public” to encompass “a group of
individuals acting as ordinary members of the public who pay pri-
marily to watch broadcast television programs,” that is, a “substan-
tial number of people.”268
3. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito Dissent
The dissent believed the question of whether Aereo was di-
rectly infringing had been glossed over.269  This question is under
the broader issue of whether Aereo actually does the performing;
the dissent did not believe Aereo performed.270  Justice Scalia
noted that direct infringement requires “volitional conduct” on the
part of Aereo.271  Similar to an Internet service provider (ISP),
which simply allows users to use its equipment to send information,
264. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §101) (noting that emailing people individu-




267. See id. at 2509–10.  The Court notes that the other piece of the public’s
definition includes “‘any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered,’” which must
insinuate a large group of people that are intimately known to the sender. See id.
at 2510 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).  The Court also noted that if the Aereo users
had some relation to the “underlying work” than whether they were part of the
“public” may change. See id.
268. See id. at 2510–11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that this
definition narrows the Court’s opinion from being construed broadly).  The Court
dismissed any public policy concerns about its ruling chilling future technologies
and going beyond Congress’ foresight by noting that its holding was very limited.
See id. This is especially true since the court did not provide any broad definitions
of what is performing, or publicly performing, or applying its analysis to companies
beyond Aereo. See id.  Furthermore, the court noted that it did not hold that “own-
ers or possessors of the relevant product” would be infringing. See id.  The Court
also remained silent on whether a “remote storage of content” type-company,
whose users transmit copyrighted material, would be included. See id. at 2511.
269. See id. at 2512, 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. See id. at 2511–12.
271. See id. at 2514.
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Aereo’s user was the one who performed by watching or recording
the program.272  Aereo’s automated response did not intrude on or
obstruct the copyright owner and his or her rights.273  Importantly,
this automated response was not running in the background, but
was “dormant until a subscriber activate[d] it.”274
Turning to his “Guilt By Resemblance” section, Justice Scalia
did not believe the majority could base its opinion “on a few iso-
lated snippets of legislative history.”275  Likewise, he believed Aereo
was distinguishable from the CATV systems Congress was con-
cerned about when it drafted the 1976 amendment.276  CATV sys-
tems were continuously sending their users all of the broadcast
channels and were essentially able, like broadcasters, to “select[ ]
and import[ ] distant signals,” begin programs, and “sell[ ] com-
mercials.”277  CATV systems were not simply selling equipment, they
were like video-on-demand services that picked and provided the
content as well.278
Finally, the dissent noted that the majority had made a third
prong of infringing conduct beyond direct and contributory.279
The dissent viewed the majority’s opinion as holding a type of technol-
ogy as publicly performing.280  This changed the Act so it applied
differently to “‘cable companies and their equivalent’” compared
to “everyone else.”281  Justice Scalia noted that the majority’s opin-
ion was overly wordy because, if Congress intended to cover all
“cable systems” of the future, then once Aereo was found to be that
type of future CATV—whether Aereo was publicly performing
would be irrelevant.282
272. See id. at 2513 (stating both ISP and Aereo’s equipment responds
“automatically”).
273. See id.
274. See id. at 2514–15 (attempting to reiterate that Aereo does not perform
and, therefore, falls under secondary liability).
275. See id. at 2515 (noting text relied on is “single report issued by a commit-
tee whose members make up a small fraction of one of the two Houses of
Congress”).
276. See id. (“[T]he Court’s reasoning fails on its own terms because there are
material differences between the cable systems at issue in [Teleprompter Corp. and
Fortnightly Corp.], on the one hand and Aereo on the other.” (citations omitted)).
277. See id. at 2515–16 (naming cable companies as “curators of content”).
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Moreover, the majority did not explain what the CATVs of the
future would be defined by.283  If “live television” was dispositive
then Aereo could just have made its “Watch” feature not start play-
ing back the program until the show had ended.284  Justice Scalia
thought this loophole made the majority’s opinion pointless.285  In
the end, Justice Scalia found the majority opinion to rest on a “to-
tality-of-the-circumstances test,” which was not defined.286  He saw
the majority’s precedent as too broad and entangling.287  The dis-
sent believed that Aereo did infringe, but it found the majority to
be “distort[ing]” the Copyright Act in its plight.288
E. Aereo IV: Similar, But Not the Same
Remanded to District Court, the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunc-
tion should have been automatically granted had Aereo not pro-
posed new arguments.289  Primarily related to its infringement,
Aereo argued that because it was now classified as a cable system it
should be allowed a “compulsory license” under the Copyright
Act.290  Alternatively, plaintiffs posed a new argument that the pre-
liminary injunction should be “expanded to cover all retransmis-
sion of their copyrighted content, regardless of when those
283. See id.
284. See id. at 2516–17 & n.6 (noting that this would just be time-shifting,
which Aereo does not currently have, even though “live” program was on ten sec-
ond delay).
285. See id. at 2517. (noting other possible dispositive criteria: (1) “stor[ing]
live television broadcasts at a user’s direction” or (2) focusing on the selling of
equipment to users).  The dissent noted that the former would counter Cablevision
and the latter would include ISPs. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id. (entangling because others will have to figure out which equip-
ment will be evaluated by the majority’s standard and which will not).  “The Court
vows that its ruling will not affect cloud-storage providers and cable-television sys-
tems, but it cannot deliver on that promise given the imprecision of its result-
driven rule.” See id. (internal citation omitted).
288. See id. at 2517–18 (“I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is
doing (or enabling to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought
not to be allowed.  But perhaps we need not distort the Copyright Act to forbid
it.”).
289. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., Nos. 12-cv-1540, 12-cv-1543, 2014 WL
5393867, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Aereo IV].
290. See id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111).
Aereo also argued that it was “mere[ly]” a “conduit” and protected under the “safe
harbor provision,” and injunction failed because plaintiffs could not show “immi-
nent irreparable harm.”  See id. The court rejected both of these arguments also.
See id. at *6–7.
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retransmission occur.”291  Aereo countered by arguing that the in-
junction should be narrowed to only the first ten minutes of a
program.292
The District Court held Aereo to be twisting the Court’s analy-
sis.293  The United States Supreme Court did not say Aereo was a
cable system, but that Aereo performed because it was similar to the
CATV.294  The District Court found no analysis in Aereo III to sup-
port Aereo’s argument.295  Aereo agreed that there was no analysis
in the opinion, but argued that support for its argument was found
in oral argument.296  The court noted that oral argument is not
binding law.297  Furthermore, precedent rejected Aereo’s
argument.298
IV. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: BREYER’S POWERFUL SUBTLETY
Prior to Aereo III, it was assumed that the Court had two op-
tions.299  One, either the Court would follow in the majority’s
shadow of Aereo I and Aereo II and hold the technological advance-
ment of Aereo did not infringe public performance, or two—it
could follow Judge Chin’s dissent in Aereo II and find public per-
formance infringement.300  Strictly speaking, the Court rebelled in
choosing a third route—finding CATV-equivalency to be publicly
291. See id. at *2.  The court did not extend, or narrow, the preliminary in-
junction that sought to prevent retransmission of currently broadcasting programs
for the sake of consistency and ruling. See id. at *8.
292. See id. at *2.
293. See id. at *3.
294. See id.
295. See id. at *4.
296. See id. (“Aereo argues that such a holding can be inferred from the ques-
tions and statements of the Justices at oral argument”).
297. See id.
298. See id. at *4–5 (citing WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir.
2012) (“Concluding that ‘Congress did not . . . intend for § 111’s compulsory li-
cense to extend to Internet transmissions’ . . . .”).  Aereo countered by arguing
that Ivi was inapplicable because Aereo’s coverage was not as expansive as the In-
ternet. See id. at *5.  The court disagreed by noting that the geographical limita-
tion concern, while mentioned in Ivi, was not dispositive, and Aereo’s
retransmissions had the potential to be as expansive as the Internet itself. See id.
Also, the court noted that Congress has not carved out § 111 protection for other
technologies that are similar to cable systems, but has created new statute-licenses
for them. See id. at *6 (noting satellite carriers arguing same and receiving “Satel-
lite Home Viewer Act of 1988”).
299. See Cramer, supra note 33, at 112 (“There are two clear-cut choices in
front of the court . . . .”).
300. See id. (noting that Judge Chin’s dissent in Aereo II followed BarryDriller
and FilmOn X).
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performing and, thus, infringing.301  Although the decision may
have been controversial, it was effective.302
The majority in Aereo III has been criticized for leaving too
many questions unanswered.303  However, while Justice Breyer
walked a narrow line, the so-called “unanswered” cry misses the
powerful and subtle nature of Aereo III.304  Certainly, the Court de-
cided the broad question of Aereo’s fate, yet it also answered the
narrow questions by noting the reversal of Fortnightly and Tele-
prompter’s rationales by Congress.305  Justice Breyer’s dependency
on the Copyright Act of 1976 was not misplaced and the opinion
was masterfully crafted to be both narrowly applicable to Aereo and
widely applicable to future technologies.306  For this reason, the
Copyright Act does not need to be amended by Congress, but can
follow the new test set out by Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in
Aereo III.307
Regarding whether Aereo’s system performed under the Copy-
right Act of 1976, Justice Breyer’s majority held that (1) Congress
301. See id. (foreseeing the two options may be ignored by noting that con-
gressional action may be needed); see also Asaro, supra note 31, at 1136 (“[T]he
majority’s opinion effectively created a new standard for cloud-based service
providers . . . .”).
302. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2512 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[A]dopting . . . an improvised standard (‘looks-like-cable-TV’) that will sow con-
fusion for years to come.”).
303. See generally Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk
About Aereo: New Controversies and Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Deci-
sion, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109 (2015); see also infra notes 315–51 and accompany-
ing test (discussing perceived problems with Justice Breyer’s majority decision).
304. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 121 (“[T]he Aereo Court’s hold-
ing is likely to be more nuanced than an initial reading might suggest.”).
305. See id. Giblin and Ginsburg note that services such as Drop-box would
not fall under the majority’s opinion because the majority is drawing a distinction
in which performing a work requires the work to be communicated by the com-
pany. See id. Drop-box does not communicate like Aereo, but stores content. See
id.
306. See, e.g., id. at 129–30.  The authors pull analytic points from the court’s
silence: (1) just because Aereo performs, as similar to CATV, does not mean non-
similar systems automatically do not perform; (2) if the program proposes some-
one else’s content (“broadcasters’ selections”) to its users than it is more likely to
perform (Aereo) than not (video-on-demand service); (3) time-shifting has less
direct involvement than a video-on-demand system, but still involves a level of “ac-
tive participation.” See id. at 129–30.  Other authors have suggested that the
“broadness of the majority’s analysis may render the Aereo opinion the touchstone
for analyzing copyright infringement as it applies to new and developing technolo-
gies.”  Shannon McGovern, Note, Aereo, In-Line Linking, and a New Approach to Copy-
right Infringement for Emerging Technologies, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 777, 796 (2015)
(noting that majority did not intend their reasoning to apply beyond Aereo).
307. See infra notes 380–448 and accompanying text (arguing Aereo III was cor-
rectly decided).
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intended to bring CATV systems within the purview of the Copy-
right Act of 1976; (2) Aereo is a technological advancement on the
CATV system; therefore, (3) Congress’ intention extended to
Aereo.308  Analytically, this means that the majority created a third
standard.309  The majority’s standard defined direct liability’s voli-
tional conduct to include a performance that generated company
profit from disseminating information, even if an individual con-
sumer could receive the same information with similar
equipment.310
As direct and indirect liability are often close partners, it is not
unconscionable that an internet streaming service, which is built
around infringement, is found to be directly infringing.311  Notably,
as Judge Chin stated in his Aereo II dissent, Aereo’s nature required
the user to transmit a copy even if all the user wanted to do was
watch the program.312  While Justice Scalia believed the majority
did not need to define what is public after its cable-like, perform-
ance analysis, Justice Breyer’s majority defined “to the public” in
order to alleviate concerns about the opinion’s applicability to fu-
ture technologies.313  The majority discarded all of Justice Scalia’s
concerns by dismissing the dissimilarities between CATV and Aereo
as distinctions that made no difference to the analysis.314
A. Perceived Problems with Breyer’s Majority
Scalia is not the only one who has disagreed with the major-
ity.315  Recently, in We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New Controver-
308. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2515 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
the same).
309. See id. at 2512–14 (2014) (stating there are only two types of liability and
majority did not follow either type).
310. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 125 (noting that majority’s non-
discussion of volition amidst outcry from dissent, “might suggest” that “the major-
ity considers volition irrelevant to the assessment of whether the defendant has
publicly performed a work”); see also supra text accompanying note 280.  Giblin
and Ginsburg go on to suggest that the majority did adopt a volition standard, as
“when the service is less ‘cable-like’ than Aereo, the majority’s distinction between
providing the equipment that enables a performance, and actually ‘performing,’
remains uncertain,” but is still considered. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303,
at 126.
311. See infra notes 390–99 and accompanying text.
312. See supra text accompanying note 241.
313. See supra text accompanying note 282; see also Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511
(discussing limited nature of opinion and non-extension to dissimilar
technologies).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 255–58.
315. See generally Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303; accord Benjamin Branda,
Up in the Airwaves: Technological Determinism, the Public Performance Right, and Aereo’s
Uncertain Future, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 287, 311 (2015) (“Jus-
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sies and Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision, Rebecca
Giblin and Jane C. Ginsburg argue that the only performance analy-
sis done by the majority was that services which act equivalent to
CATVs were not “mere ‘equipment provider[s].’”316  The authors
do not believe the volitional conduct analysis was present, which is
required when dissecting direct infringement.317  To the majority’s
second prong of public performance, Giblin and Ginsburg note
that the majority combined two different situations highlighted in
the Copyright Act.318
The authors believe “‘to the public, by means of any device or
process,’” which deals with transmission was combined with, “ ‘to
perform or display a work publicly,’” which deals with actually per-
forming in public.319  The authors were concerned with the major-
ity using the latter physical performance in the public square
definition to elucidate the former non-physical transmission defini-
tion.320  However, the authors found Justice Breyer’s statement of
the issue supported his understanding that only offering delivery
(versus proving delivery) is required.321  Historically, this follows the
established argument that commercial use cannot extend to cover
uses of the individual.322
tice Breyer’s defense of the Aereo opinion’s effect on discouraging the emergence
of new technologies is backwards-looking.”).
316. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 118.
317. See id. at 117.
318. See id. at 118.
319. See id. at 109, 118 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
320. See id. at 119 (noting the majority could be read to endorse that a trans-
mission does not need to just have been “merely offered,” but “made” and
“receiv[ed]”).  The authors do not believe the majority intended this outcome be-
cause a plain reading of the Transmit clause uses the word “‘public capable of
receiving,’” which points to Aereo just offering as being enough. See id. (quoting
17 U.S.C. § 101).  Likewise, the majority did not do a “head-count[ ]” of Aereo’s
users who actually watched (versus received only) the broadcasts.  See id. at 120.  A
contrary view has argued that the in the public helps define the word “public” for to
the public, and even if disagreed with, a common understanding of to the public
involves a group of people. See Bryan Giribaldo, Comment, Walking the Semantics
Tight-Rope: Defining “Public Performance” in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 19 J. TECH.
L. & POL’Y 147, 152–53 (2014).
321. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 120 (emphasis added) (arguing
this is supported by Justice Breyer stating, “by selling its subscribes . . . that allows
them to watch” (quoting Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014))).  The authors
note that this is in accordance with the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty, which is focused on preventing “‘making available’” the
works to the public. See id. at 121 (quoting World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, art. 8).
322. See id. at 131.  The authors also noted disagreement with the majority not
focusing on the “relationship between the performing entity and the audience,” and
its use of the fair use doctrine as a safety-net. See id. at 122, 124.
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In reverse order, the authors next discuss the majority’s silence
on the volitional standard of direct infringement.323  While the au-
thors note the opinion’s silence they also note that the majority was
drawing a distinction between merely providing equipment for its
user and Aereo’s more involved conduct.324  This insinuates that an
analysis of volition was occurring; yet the authors continue to go
back and forth about the majority’s intent.325  Essentially, the au-
thors concede some volition-analysis was taking place.326  However,
the authors are most concerned with applying Aereo III to technolo-
gies like Aereo which have no “[w]atch” function and only re-
cord.327  Yet, this goes beyond Aereo III’s fact-specific holding, as did
the dissent in its concern for future technologies.328
It was the focus on fact specific “design characteristics” over a
“principled reading of the Transmit Clause” that was concerning.329
Giblin and Ginsburg agreed that the Transmit Clause did not re-
quire the public to be a specific size when defining “to the public”
because the clause was meant to accommodate the popularization
of technologies over time.330 Aereo III used in public to help define
to the public and required the size to be “substantial.”331  In the au-
thors’ opinions, this required the Court to find that Aereo per-
formed instead of the user because if the user were found to
perform, then their transmission would not be to the public, as de-
fined by the majority’s in public’s rationale.332  This would create an
“enormous new loophole” that would disturb the whole system.333
323. See id. at 124–25.
324. See id. at 125.
325. See id. at 126 (noting that majority’s swift dismissal of dissent’s concerns
shows lack of consideration, but then going back to the opinion of conducting
“role of the user” analysis which also insinuates conscious thought).  See also Sa-
muel J. Dykstra, Note, Weighing Down the Cloud: The Public Performance Rights and the
Internet After Aereo, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 989, 1041 (2015), which reiterated Justice
Scalia’s belief that no analysis of volition took place in the majority’s opinion.
326. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 125–26.  The authors concede
this in later analysis.  See supra text accompanying notes 306.
327. See id. at 127–28 (noting that analysis of public in Cablevision is dead).
The authors believe that Aereo would still be found to infringe even if they only
starting airing after the program finished.  See id. at 129.
328. See id. at 129 (“The Aereo Court carefully avoided giving any explicit gui-
dance about ‘who performs’ in circumstances outside the cable TV analogy.”); see
also supra text accompanying notes 253, 262.
329. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 140.
330. See id. at 141–42.
331. See id. at 142; see also supra text accompanying note 268.
332. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 142.
333. See id.
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Giblin and Ginsburg hold this to be the reason volition was not
the focus of the opinion.334  However, they note, while the opinion
blurred the line of primary and secondary infringement, the major-
ity could be making a statement that direct infringement occurs in
situations like Aereo.335  The authors believe the majority had to
change the analysis because its rationale would find no direct in-
fringement where the user is only performing for a “small number
of people.”336
While the authors note that Aereo III stands for a new analysis,
the authors do not find its analysis to be “desirable.”337  They prefer
to focus on whether “the use should be permitted for free.”338
Without this focus the authors believe Aereo III is just as susceptible
to loopholes as the act, since Aereo could avoid infringement by
sending the programming in downloads to users’ cloud storage in-
stead of streaming the content.339  This would mean Aereo was not
performing because it was not involved in the user watching or
downloading the program.340
In Giblin’s own analysis, Justice Breyer’s majority needed to
more completely defined what it meant to perform to the public.341
She believes the focal point should be the user’s relation to the
work.342  Following Australia and the United Kingdom, the ques-
tion would be whether the user streaming the program is the con-
sumer who the copyright owner would consider as his or her
audience.343  In other words, if the owner is expecting payment he
334. See id. It is not clear how solving the volition question would solve the
problem of the giant loophole because even if direct infringement is not found,
the authors’ note that indirect infringement could still ruin Aereo’s chances. See
id. at 141–44.
335. See id. at 144 (“[The Court’s opinion] may blur the distinction between
primary and secondary infringement, at least in scenarios resembling Aereo’s.”).
336. See id. at 144.  The authors note this when they state: “[o]ur application
of Aereo’s principles to other technologies demonstrates that a great deal hangs on
‘who does the act,’” despite they themselves not favoring the majority’s analysis See
id..
337. See id.
338. See id. at 145.  The authors believe that the majority’s focus will harm
innovation by requiring all innovators to only produce if the user is directly in-
volved in the use. See id. at 145–46.
339. See id. at 146.
340. See id. Yet, the authors note that this new Aereo download system would
still most likely not get them off the hook for secondary liability. See id. at 146–47.
341. See id. at 149.
342. See id.
343. See id. (citing Telstra Corp. v. Australasian Performing Rights Ass’n
(1997) 191 CLR 140, 198–200 (Austl.), which cites Ernest Turner Elec. Instru-
ments Ltd. v. Performing Rights Soc’y Ltd., [1943] Ch. 167 at 171–73 (Eng.)).
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should receive payment.344  Interestingly, Giblin’s analysis does not
focus on “‘who performs,’” but on the “relationship between the
recipient and the work.”345  Giblin admits that this is circular rea-
soning, but argues that the courts have allowed similar arguments
in the arena of the public’s “relationship to the underlying
work.”346  In the end, Giblin believes Aereo III’s analysis was
unfinished.347
Ginsburg, unlike her co-writer, does not couch the issue of per-
formance within the definition of “public.”348  Ginsburg first articu-
lates that the money should be examined to determine who is
performing; thus, volition would depend on whether the company
is “proposing the content” to the user, or simply allowing the user
to “access” the content.349  Additionally, Ginsburg views “to the pub-
lic” as also following the money in the sense that the service should
be examined to determine if the service-user relationship is focused
on lawful activity or unlawful activity.350  Likewise, Ginsburg ex-
presses concern for requiring the audience size to be substantial
because a single person, in the aggregate, could have a big eco-
nomic impact.351
B. Translating the Transmit Clause
The consensus among scholars is that Aereo was not perform-
ing because the work was a copy of the original, and the perform-
ance was not public because each individual received their own
copy.352  Professor David Nimmer believes the original copy must
344. See id. (noting that this could even apply to transmitting amidst one’s
own devices).  Giblin does not explain how her analysis is not also focused on a
concern for business, except to focus on “use.” See id. She admits that whether the
owner is expecting payment is a totality of the circumstances test, which looks to
“all relevant circumstances.” See id. at 151.
345. See id. at 150.  Confusingly, she still holds that who performs matters as to
deciding whether direct liability exists. See id.
346. See id. at 152.
347. See id. at 152–53.
348. See id. at 153 (“We have identified two problems. . . .”).
349. See id. at 153–54.  Ginsburg argues the former is infringing. See id. at 154.
350. See id. at 155 (focusing on “what the service does, not how it does it”).
That is, Ginsburg views transferring one’s files between one’s computers as not “to
the public” because one has a personal stock in lawful property; however, this stock
is not present in illegal, copyrighted material. See id.
351. See id. at 155–56.  The authors do not believe the majority’s opinion
would fail to prevent aggregation, assuming secondary liability can tell the differ-
ence between innovation and “exploiters.” See id. at 156.
352. See Krista Consiglio, Aereo and Filmon: Technology’s Latest Copyright War and
Why Aereo Should Survive, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2557, 2593 (2014).
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be retransmitted for there to be a public performance.353  He ar-
gues that Congress intended this interpretation when it noted that
the person did not need to be in the same location to listen to the
copy.354  He believes this geographical point would be irrelevant if a
copy of the original would infringe.355  If there were multiple cop-
ies of the original then it would be assumed that different people
were listening to them at different locations and at different
times.356
Scholar William Patry adheres to an even more original inter-
pretation of the Copyright Act by arguing that the performance has
to be live.357  If the performance is recorded than the issue be-
comes the “exclusive-distribution right.”358  This understanding is
based on how Patry defines “public place.”359  Judge Daniel Bren-
ner believes that if a company pays licensing fees for the original
performances, the same company should not have to pay to trans-
mit over the Internet.360  Judge Brenner also argues for a “substan-
tial enough audience” in order for the performance to be public.361
Conversely, Consiglio believes Nimmer and Patry are incorrect,
as the Copyright Act of 1976 only requires the performance occur,
not that it occur in a certain manner.362  Likewise, Consiglio be-
lieves the public definition in the Transmit Clause is broad enough
to cover Internet distribution, regardless of whether the users re-
ceive it individually, or as a conglomerate.363
353. See id. at 2590 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT §8.14[C][3] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2013)).
354. See id. at 2591.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id. (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:21 (2008)).
Patry is “a major copyright treatise author and senior copyright counsel at Google.”
See id.
358. See id.
359. See id. (“A public place is one that the public has access to despite any
condition to entry, such as an admission fee.”).
360. See id. at 2592 (citing Daniel Brenner, “Gently Down the Stream”: When is an
Online Performance Public Under Copyright?, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1167, 1168
(2013)) (viewing Copyright Act protections as not “extend[ing] as far [on the In-
ternet] as for other mediums”).
361. See Consiglio, supra note 354, at 2592–93 (pointing to transmit clause
and its language that people (“the public”) actually “receive” the content (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
362. See id. at 2593 & n.280 (citing 17 U.S.C. §101) (“‘[By means of any device
or process . . . .’”).
363. See id. at 2594–95 (noting that Aereo II was incorrect in its analysis).
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C. The Copyright Office & Congress: Beacons
of Unlikely Change
After the case was remanded, Aereo believed it was entitled to
§111 Retransmission fees, as a CATV-equivalent system.364  While
the district court in Aereo IV did not believe similarity allowed Aereo
to claim CATV status, the concern seemed to be that Aereo, unlike
CATV, did not pay initially for the copyrighted material.365  How-
ever, since the Copyright Office denied Aereo’s application for
§111 licensing fees to apply, there is strong doubt that Aereo-like
services were intended to fall under §111 at all.366  While Congress
could amend the Copyright Act, overcoming deference to the Cop-
yright Office is unlikely.367
Alternatively, authors propose a new section in the Copyright
Act of 1976 that specifically addresses cloud-based storage de-
vices.368  The author notes that Aereo III should have made Aereo a
cable company for Copyright Act purposes.369  However, since this
was not done, the Copyright Act should be revised to define cloud-
service technology and give them a “new compulsory licensing
scheme.”370  It is argued that this would be more “cost effective”
and could more easily balance owners’ rights and the right of
cloud-service companies without chilling innovation.371  Returning
to Congress’ original concern for cable companies, the author
notes small-player-status and the time consuming “bargain on a sig-
nal-by-signal basis.”372  The argument is that these cloud-service
companies and Aereo-like companies have similar problems and,
thus, should not be required to pay for content that individuals can
receive by buying their own antennas.373  The author proposes ex-
empting content under these licensing agreements based on geog-
raphy or viewership demands.374
Additionally, Congress’ creation of a separate license for satel-
lite carriers is an example of the need for a new section.375  How-
364. See supra notes 289–98 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 298.
366. See Cramer, supra note 33, at 119.
367. See id. at 120.
368. See, e.g., Asaro, supra note 31, at 1111, 1140–41.




373. See id. at 1141.
374. See id.
375. See Cramer, supra note 33, at 119.
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ever, the Copyright Office continues to hold that allowing such
statutory licenses would allow Internet companies to infringe the
rights of copyright owners by not obtaining the owner’s original
consent.376  The Copyright Office reaffirmed this view in 2011.377
The Copyright Office’s opinion is strongly respected, as the office’s
knowledge and analysis are highly valued.378  Congress is not blind
to technological advancement yet has refused to act.379
D. Aereo III was Correctly Decided
Although legal commenters have labeled Aereo III as difficult to
analyze and apply, the opinion has been successfully applied to al-
ternative situations.380  In hypothetically applying Aereo III to Drop-
box, Drop-box was not found to perform because there was no
transmission of Drop-box to the consumer, thus, no infringement
of the copyrighted works.381  Alternatively, even if Drop-box was
376. See id. at 120 (noting that much has changed “since 2008”).
377. See WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2012); see also U.S.
Copyright Office, Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act § 302 Report 48
(2011), available at http://copyright.gov/reports/section302-report.pdf (“The Of-
fice itself has opposed (and continues to oppose) the formation of a statutory li-
cense for the retransmission of broadcast signals over the Internet.”).
378. See Ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d at 283.  The Copyright Office’s analysis focused on
the more local nature of cable systems versus Aereo. See Keith M. Stolte, Is Cheap
Internet TV Dead?  Duck Hunting Season Comes Early to the Supreme Court, 26 No. 10
INTELL. PROP & TECH. L.J. 3, Oct. 2014, at *8.
379. See Johanna R. Alves-Parks, Adapt or Die: Aereo, IVI, and the Rights of Control
in an Evolving Digital Age, 34 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 33, 63 & nn.218–220 (2014)
(citing Future of Video: How Advances in Consumer Electronics, Broad., Cable, Satellite, the
Internet and Other Platforms Are Changing How Consumers Access Video Content: Hearing
Before the Commc’ns and Tech. Subcomm. of the House Energy and Commerce Comm.,
112th Cong. (2012)) (noting that Congress held hearing where executives and
industry leaders discussed “effect of unlicensed Internet retransmissions”); generally
Bradley Ryba, Aerevolution: Why We Should, Briefly, Embrace Unlicensed Online Stream-
ing of Retransmitted Broadcast Television Content, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
577 (2014) (arguing that Aereo has benefits in short term).
380. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 132 (applying their own analysis
of Aereo III).  Perhaps Aereo is more easily applied because copyright case law is
naturally aimed at remaining malleable so it can extend to new technologies. See
Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity’s Unstated Domain: The
Role of Equity in Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1861–62 (2015)
(labeling this phenomenon “giving effect to the equity of the statute”).
381. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 132–33 (noting that first ques-
tion must be “who engages in the transmission,” and that there was no perform-
ance by Drop-box); see also Todd Spangler, Why a Loss for Aereo Wouldn’t Threaten
Cloud Services, VARIETY (Mar. 28, 2014, 12:33 PM), http://variety.com/2014/digi-
tal/news/why-a-loss-for-aereo-wouldnt-threaten-cloud-services-1201149611/ (not-
ing that Drop-box could not fall under Aereo III majority because Aereo is actively
involved, unlike Drop-box).  Authors who believe Drop-box would infringe if a
user utilized the service to store an illegal download miss Giblin’s and Justice
Breyer’s point that simple storage is not volitional enough to satisfy Aereo III’s
analysis; Aereo’s act were not merely passive. See, e.g., Collette Corser, Note, ABC v.
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found to be performing, transferring files between one’s own de-
vices would not meet the “to the public” standard found in Aereo
III.382
Aereo III was also applied to “Slinging” devices, which were de-
termined to perform publicly.383  Slinging devices allow content to
be sent between devices solely by transmission.384  Because Dish
sold these slinging devices for profit, the device’s location in the
user’s home is not enough to overcome Dish’s direct involve-
ment.385  Also, Dish publicly performs because the users are being
sold a service and the user has no “prior relationship” with the con-
tent.386  There has even been no problem in applying Aereo III to a
“‘Tablet TV,’” which places a device in the user’s hands, and acts as
a “digital TV antenna, tuner and DVR” combined.387  This tablet
TV device allows the user to stream content within one hundred
feet.388  This was not a performance because there was no involve-
ment by a company like Aereo, and the devices were individually
owned, which meant there was no public performance.389  This
ease of applying Aereo III supports the majority opinion’s subtle
strength.
1. A Subtle Performance Analysis
Even in 1984, determining direct versus indirect infringement
of recording equipment was difficult because it was hard to deter-
mine when the infringer was using the work versus “authoriz[ing]”
another to use the work.390  Direct infringement involves an inten-
tional act in relation to a copyrighted work.391  Indirect infringe-
Aereo: How The Supreme Court’s Flawed Rationale Will Implicate Problems in New Tech-
nologies, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 22–23 (2015).
382. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 134 (noting that there is a con-
nection between the Drop-box user and uploaded content because the user
uploaded it).
383. See id. at 137–38.
384. That is—no copying, only transmitting. See id. at 134.
385. See id. at 137.
386. See id. at 138.
387. See id. at 139.
388. See id.
389. See id.
390. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17
(1984).  Sony’s product, “home video tape records,” (VCR/VTR) were used by cus-
tomers to record public broadcast programs. See id. at 420.  The Court was very
concerned about stopping VCR sales because an ancillary use was to record these
programs, which would grant a monopoly against Sony. See id. at 441 n.21.
391. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Applying Aereo to the Internet: Understanding Voli-
tional Links to Leaked Films, Television Episodes, and Scripts as Copyright Infringement, 18
NO. 5 J. INTERNET L. 1, Nov. 2014, at *13; accord Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2513
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ment involves “intentionally inducing or encouraging direct
infringement” (contributory), or “by profiting from direct infringe-
ment while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it”
(vicarious).392
Applying these principals to the non-traditional forum of the
Internet becomes fuzzy.393  Although applying these principles to a
computer’s “automatic response” is less murky when the infringer is
completely “passive,” Aereo was not passive.394  Aereo was not an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) whose technology makes the ISP’s
conduct “passive, automatic acts.”395  Aereo’s service does not
merely allow its users access to an Internet-equivalent, where other
users provide the infringing works; Aereo was the user providing the
infringing content.396  Obviously, a copy shop would not be directly
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A defendant may be held directly liable only if it
has engaged in volitional conduct that violates the Act.”).
392. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
393. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006) (find-
ing automatic responses by Google in response to user’s search and click of the
link is not direct copyright infringement).  While the Internet application is diffi-
cult, it is not impossible when the application does not require “hold[ing] the
entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.” See Relig-
ious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365–66, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (involving critic of Church of Scientology who
posted parts of church’s works on bulletin board service, which paid Netcom for
internet access).  Application to Aereo poses no such problem, as the problem
with a direct infringement analysis of the Internet is that ISPs do not “create or
control the content of the information available.” See id. at 1368.  In this way, the
ISP is a copy shop. See id. at 1369.  In his Aereo III dissent, Justice Scalia noted that
Aereo was not an ISP or copy shop, but a copy shop with the added volitional
conduct of handing out a “library card.”  See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
394. Compare CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 546–47, 550
(4th Cir. 2004) (Internet Service Provider not directly liable for not intervening in
user’s posting of copyrighted photographs), and Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948
F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (no direct infringement where person did not
“directly cause[ ] the copying” by actually uploading or downloading the files him-
self or causing the copying “to occur”), with Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v.
Spring Nextel Corp., 338 Fed. App’x 329, 336 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding “loading of
the software onto . . . computers” satisfied volitional act—though failing to men-
tion whether this was under direct or indirect analysis).
395. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620, 621–22
(4th Cir. 2001) (involving whether DMCA gives ISPs shield from copyright in-
fringement).  Even Justice Scalia in Aereo III does not believe Aereo is an ISP. See
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
396. See ALS Scan, Inc., 239 F.3d at 620, 622 (noting district court determined
ISP is “passive conduit for copyrighted material”).  Discussing Aereo’s knowledge
of its user’s infringement, in the indirect infringement analysis, would not be sensi-
ble since Aereo’s purpose is providing this content to the user and his or her abil-
ity to watch that content. Compare id. at 622 (insinuating that knowledge is
required), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (“It does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of the
copyright infringement.”).  Thus, Aereo’s conduct is more volitional by its very
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liable for a customer’s use of his shop to illegally copy, but even
Justice Scalia held Aereo not to be just a copy shop, but a copy shop
with a “library card.”397  The distinctions of Aereo’s technology cor-
rectly prove its more direct involvement.398  Like Napster, which
was found to directly infringe because its sole use was infringement
by the “downloading or uploading of copyrighted music,” Aereo’s
sole purpose was to transmit copyrighted programs.399
Aereo II had to be overruled, as the Second Circuit incorrectly
focused on the uniqueness of the individual copies.400  Contrary to
the belief that Aereo III had no volitional standard, the majority did
establish one.401  The volitional standard was not openly discussed
nature than an indirect infringement analysis requires. See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1117–19, 1121–22 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(noting that even bulletin board service provider could be held directly liable de-
pending on infringing website’s volitional act as established by its relationship to
other websites which have infringed copyrights); see also Lee B. Burgunder, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 845, 867–69 (2015) (“The three dissenting judges in
Aereo, unfortunately, fell for the smokescreen raised by Aereo and its amicus cu-
riae supporters, who clouded the analysis with faulty arguments about volitional
conduct.  . . .  First of all, Aereo’s customers did not come to Aereo with their own
independently acquire materials, whether they were obtained from a public library
or elsewhere.  Rather Aereo gave them access to copyrighted materials on its prop-
erty that Aereo, as the property owner, had no right to show or transmit to the
public.”).
397. Compare CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550 (holding ISP to be an “owner of a tradi-
tional copying machine whose customers pay a fixed amount per copy and operate
the machine themselves to make copies”), with Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“So which is Aereo: the copy shop or the video-on-demand service?
In truth, it is neither.  Rather, it is akin to a copy shop that provides its patrons with
a library card.”).
398. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509–10. But see Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Net-
work L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding Dish’s similar technol-
ogy was not direct infringement because “Dish’s program creates the copy only in
response to the user’s command”).
399. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D.
Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
400. See Megan Larkin, The Demise of the Copyright Act in the Digital Realm: Re-
engineering Digital Delivery Models to Circumvent Copyright Liability After Aereo, 37
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 405, 426 (2014).  In this vein, some have argued for a focus on
defining performance on whether the original transmission is being performed or
a copy, the latter not being infringement.  See, e.g., Jacob Marshall, Note, Trading
Rabbit Ears for Wi-Fi: Aereo, the Public Performance Right, and How Broadcasters Want to
Control the Business of Internet TV, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 909, 940–41 (2014)
(relying on Melville Nimmer’s dis-analogous hypothetical of a phonograph playing
the same record in both person A and person B’s home, as too absurd to be in-
fringement).  However, Justice Breyer disavowed this analysis by granting Aereo
the argument that it was producing a new performance.  See supra text accompany-
ing note 259.
401. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 150. But see Gardner v.
CafePress Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168328, *9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014) (“[T]he
Supreme Court [in Aereo III] expressly decided not to address the volitional con-
duct issue . . . .”).  Some authors have advised applying the volitional standard
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because it was not an official question presented before the
Court.402  However, Justice Breyer discussed the issue under the
public performance question.403  He ended his analysis of whether
Aereo performed by noting that Aereo was not simply an “equip-
ment provider,” which was a statement against applying secondary
infringement.404  By following Congress’ analysis in rebutting Fort-
nightly and Teleprompter, Justice Breyer refuted those courts’ analy-
ses.405 Fortnightly’s analysis refused to acknowledge a volitional
standard of direct infringement by finding that the CATV, even
with control over content, did not perform.406 Teleprompter’s analy-
sis that CATV had no “nexus” to make its transmissions directly cop-
ying was a lack of volition argument.407  And Congress rebutted
these views on volition with the Copyright Act of 1976.408
Supporting Congress’ decision and drawing the parallel to
Aereo, Justice Breyer addressed the volitional standard.409  Origi-
nally concerned about writing an over inclusive opinion, Breyer de-
ferred to Congress.410  If Justice Breyer had ignored the issue of
performance completely, then possibly one could argue that his
opinion ignored the volitional question and was patently against ap-
plying secondary infringement.411  However, Justice Breyer did not
ignore it, but rightfully found that in combating Fortnightly and Tele-
prompter, Congress intended that Aereo’s acts were directly involved
established in Aereo III very narrowly. See Ira S. Sacks, Mark S. Lafayette & Amy S.
Price, Aereo: Another View, 26 NO. 12 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 17, Dec. 2014, at
*19 (2014).
402. See Larkin, supra note 400, at 436.
403. See id. at 437 (predicting that public performance had to be discussed in
Aereo III).
404. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 (2014).
405. See id. at 2506–07 (noting similarities to Fortnightly and Teleprompter).
406. See supra text accompanying notes 37–43.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
408. See supra text accompanying note 47.
409. See supra text accompanying note 253.
410. See supra text accompanying note 254; see also Oral Argument at
3:00–3:40, 3:57–4:18, 14:37–15:19, 20:46–21:28, Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
(No. 13-461) [hereinafter Aereo III Oral Argument], available at http://www.oyez
.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_13_461#argument (noting concern for physical
stores who sell physical copies of music as being public performers without first
sale doctrine argument).
411. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 127 (“The majority provided no
explicit guidance about the circumstances in which a technology provider will be
taken to have engaged in the relevant act except where they are closely analogous to
CATV providers.”).
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in transmission of the product and, thus, the volitional conduct was
present.412
Justice Breyer correctly found direct infringement because the
line between direct and indirect infringement on the Internet is too
intertwined to be distinguishable in Aereo’s case.413  In addressing
the issue of clickable links on websites, it has been noted that be-
cause links do not copy or distribute information, the volitional act
needed for direct infringement is found only in links that a user
inserts into a document or webpage.414  In contrast, the pages of
links that a search engine generates when a person searches some-
thing on Google are “automatic” links, which do not ascribe voli-
tional conduct to Google because it is simply gathering links from
across the web at the user’s request.415  Aereo falls under the first
category because it is specifically inserting the programming for its
users by assigning the technology to that user and allowing them to
“click it” or not.416  While the user is clicking “[w]atch,” it is Aereo
412. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506–07; see also supra notes 33–46 and accom-
panying text.  Notably, Justice Breyer does not name the volition standard, but
does assume it in the analysis of whether finding that a cloud-service has publicly
performed by storing users’ music, excludes compulsory licenses from applying.
See Aereo III Oral Argument, supra note 410, at 47:49–48:47, 49:40–49:57 (noting
that his concern for whether fair use applies to this cloud-service should be an-
swered “in a parallel way” to a question of volition—whether the user is copying or
not).  ABC’s attorney, Paul D. Clement, notes that the volitional question is in-
volved in the reproduction right, but is “answered by the Transmit Clause.” See id.
at 57:04–57:35 (transmit clause holds “sender of that transmission, if it allows con-
temporaneous performance,” to have volition).
Justice Breyer also disagreed with Aereo’s counsel at oral argument that the
question was simply one of equipment use and noted that “what disturbs everyone”
is Aereo, in the future, picking “up every television signal in the world” and becom-
ing a cable company without any restrictions.  See id. at 39:45–40:17.  Justice Breyer
also noted his concern that if Aereo was found to be similar to a cable system, but
not a cable system, they would have to go find each copyright owner and get per-
mission. See id. at 58:15–58:42.
413. See Podlas, supra note 391, at *15 (discussing trouble courts have had in
establishing how link is involved in direct versus indirect infringement).
414. See id. at 15–17; see also Kimberlianne Podlas, Linking to Liability: When
Linking to Leaked Movies, Scripts, and Television Shows is Copyright Infringement, 6
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 41, 82–83 (2015) (“The linker must locate and choose
content to which to link, decide to insert a link, determine where in the document
or webpage to insert the link, and decide how to label and contextualize [the
link].”).  Podlas notes the recent high profile “million dollar lawsuit against
Gawker Media and AnonFiles.com” by Quentin Tarantino for “linking to his
leaked screenplay.” See id. at 47.  Interestingly, Podlas concluded that Tarantino
should have argued direct infringement of his public performance right instead of
secondary infringement. See id. at 94.
415. See Podlas, supra note 391, at *17.
416. See supra note text accompanying notes 239–42.  Note this argument
against Aereo would not sweep in services that store music in the cloud at the
user’s request. See Brandon J. Trout, Note, Infringers or Innovators? Examining Copy-
right Liability for Cloud-Based Music Locker Services, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729,
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that is “inserting” the content into the “document” in order for the
user to click or not.417
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion is implicitly acknowledging
Aereo’s volition when comparing the technology of CATV to
Aereo.418  Of course he is comparing technologies, but there seems
to be nothing wrong with looking at the process or device since the
Copyright Act itself uses these words.419  Copyrighted works are no
longer so simple that the technological components take a back
seat to the content and distribution.420  It seems odd to focus only
on the technology when dealing with secondary infringement but
ignore it when arguing for direct infringement, as secondary as-
sumes direct infringement by a third party.421  If the technology is
important in determining secondary infringement, it should be just
as important when the technology makes the provider as inter-
twined with infringement as the user.422
748–49 (2012) (noting that user is performing by uploading music to cloud, but
there is no similar transmission by service beyond allowing it).
417. See supra note text accompanying notes 239–42.
418. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014).
419. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.  “To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process. . . .” See id.  “A
‘device,’ ‘machine,’ or ‘process’ is one now known or later developed.” See id.
This shows that the newness of Aereo’s technology does not matter, but the tech-
nology itself does.  Authors believe focusing on the technology places too much
trust in judges clearly delineating between the different technology systems accu-
rately. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 38, at 89 (noting that trust “rests on an exagger-
ated self-confidence”).  Other authors disagree on whether the United States
Supreme Court should remain silent on technological analyses and defer to
agency decisions. Compare Oliver Sylvain, Disruption and Deference, 74 MD. L. REV.
715, 735–38 (2015) (advising that courts should determine first if agency is more
fit to answer question before proceeding to substance of legal issue), with Zahr K.
Said, Defending Deference: A Reply to Professor Sylvain’s Disruption and Deference, 74 MD.
L. REV. 777, 781–82 (2015) (believing that Sylvain left few issues unanswered, for
example, what if judges are deciding administrative issues as “interpreters of last
resort” and not overstepping their bounds).
420. See Copyright Act of 1976—Transmit Clause—ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 128
HARV. L. REV. 371, 376–78 (2014) (noting that Justice Breyer is focusing on
Aereo’s functional equivalency to CATV versus Justice Scalia who is focusing on
Aereo’s technological form—both focusing on technology).
421. See Podlas, supra note 391, at *19.
422. See id.  To illustrate just how intertwined Aereo infringement is—picture
the Amazon Cloud Player (ACP), which allows users to store music and play music
through any handheld device over the cloud. See Cullen Kiker, Amazon Cloud
Player: The Latest Front in the Copyright Cold War, 17 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 235, 243–44
(2012) (describing Amazon’s service).  The author notes that Amazon is not a di-
rect infringer because there is no volitional act; ACP is analogized to the copy store
that allows a person to walk into the store and make the copy. See id. at 257.  The
author goes further, pointing out that if the user were to send a copyrighted fax
from the copy shop, which is then received and automatically resent to the user
(analogous to how ACP user can automatically play his songs), the copy shop is not
directly liable. See id. at 257.
56
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss1/4
2016] AEREO III:  STOP BASHING BREYER 205
Concernedly, if Aereo is not directly liable, then no streaming
service will be found directly liable.423  In order to combat this out-
come, the volitional standard for systems like Aereo must be based
on a “totality of facts” test.424  In this regard, the act of creating a
system whose sole purpose is infringement is a volitional act—just
an “earlier” volitional act.425  This is vital to copyright holders; if no
direct infringement is found because there is no volitional act then
there may be no claim for secondary liability when suing the
user.426
However, unlike Aereo, ACP’s service is a blank slate of simple storage space
before the user uploads his music. See id.  Aereo is not a blank slate but has a list
ready for the user. See supra notes 141–54.  In the fax analogy, Aereo is the copy
shop that provides a walk-in-customer with a list of copyrighted material they can
fax, has the user pick the work, then places the work on the fax, and asks the user
to press send. See 4 MELVILLE B NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12B.06 (Matthew Bender, Rev. ed., 2014) (noting there is difference between ISP
who allows users complete discretion in what websites they create and post, and
Google which “made the initial decision to send the Googlebot to cache many
millions of web pages”).
Nimmer argues that when you set up the automatic system to provide the
users with a list of copyrighted material, there is more volition than a completely
user-choice system. See id.; see also Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 2d 124, 148–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that “automated filtering and
human review” transform an automated system from passive to volitional). Usenet
imported the volitional analysis of the copyright issues of reproduction and public
performance to the distribution right. See Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
But see In re Celico P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (failing to import
Usenet’s analysis back into public performance right because court did not view
Usenet’s volitional threshold high enough for similar volitional act under public
performance).  Noteworthy, Celico involved an argument that tried to link Ver-
izon’s profit from selling ringtones to the user’s volitional act of playing the
ringtones in public. See Celico, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
423. See Carrie Bodner, Master Copies, Unique Copies and Volitional Conduct: Car-
toon Network’s Implications for the Liability of Cyber Lockers, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 491,
515 (2013) (noting that if direct infringement must require “some degree of actual
human involvement” then automated services will likely not be directly liable
ever).  However, even Bodner notes that direct liability has been found when the
employees of the service are involved in the uploading of the content. See id. at
515.
424. See id. at 516 (noting that courts are looking at “awareness and exploita-
tion of the use of its services for infringement as well as control over the infringe-
ment”).  Recently, there has been insinuation that the volition standard could be
met by a website uploading the copyrighted content to its server; Aereo’s list of
broadcasted content being similar. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F.
Supp. 2d 1303, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding no direct infringement because
website merely allowed users to upload and download content); see also infra note
433.
425. See Bodner, supra note 423, at 517 (arguing that system’s “automated
nature” cannot preclude finding of direct infringement).
426. See id. at 518–19 (noting that where direct infringement of user is obvi-
ous there has been lack of analysis for system’s direct infringement); accord Giblin
& Ginsburg, supra note 303, at 144 (“[W]ithout any direct infringement there can
be no basis for holding the service provider secondarily liable.”).
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2. Public is Tied to Performance
The United States Code defines “public” in two ways: (1) actu-
ally performing in public and (2) transmitting a performance in
public, or to the public.427  Transmission is defined by the use of “any
device or process” and can be transmitted to people who are in
different locations and receive it at “different times” in the day.428
The very fact that (1) is isolated from (2), but (2) refers to (1)—
shows that the Transmit Clause (2) intends for a performance sent
over a medium—capable of playing that performance—to be a
public performance.429  This means (1)’s statement that “where a
substantial number of persons . . . is gathered” can be imported
into to the public without issue, as Justice Breyer did.430  By reinforc-
ing (2) this way, Justice Breyer simply supported why a transmission
of a television program to an individual in his home is a public
performance—because that one person is part of a “substantial
number.”431
The act of transmission, or “streaming,” is not the same as
downloading for public performance purposes.432  Streaming is de-
fined as “ ‘relating to or being the transfer of data (as audio or video
material) in a continuous stream especially for immediate process-
ing or playback.’”433  Importantly, streaming is not equivalent to
downloading because streaming does not involve storing content
beyond the stream itself.434  That is, while streaming is occurring
there is a “ ‘buffer’” zone where the program is loaded in advance
so there will be no pauses, but this data, in the buffer zone, is not
427. See supra text accompanying note 59.
428. See supra text accompanying note 59
429. See SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW §4.19 (2014), available at 2014 WL
6856141 (“However, when a copyrighted work is distributed online to a user who
may be sitting at home, there has been a public performance under subsection
(2).”).  This is in contrast to a download which is not capable of playing the per-
formance. See id.
430. See id. (establishing number of required people to be in attendance at
public event is equivalent of in public); see also supra text accompanying notes 59,
268.
431. See SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW, supra note 429, at §4.19; see also supra text
accompanying notes 59; cf. Giblin, supra note 303, at 141 (arguing that importing
(1)’s number equivalent into (2) misses point of transmit clause).
432. See SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW, supra note 429, at §4.19.
433. See Sam Medez, Aereo and Cablevision: How Courts Are Struggling to Harmo-
nize the Public Performance Right with Online Retransmission of Broadcast Television, 9
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 239, 243 (2014) (quoting Dictionary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/streaming).
434. See id. (discussing difference and noting that streaming involves right of
reproduction and public performance).
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stored once the program is closed.435  This distinction is important
because streaming alone involves the public performance right.436
However, there is disagreement as to whether streaming to one’s
computer is public.437
Justice Breyer was not unsupported in finding an act of stream-
ing (a performance) to also be public because the Internet itself
allows anyone to access it.438  A public performance has been found
when the transmission is from a computer to external monitors.439
A public performance has also been found when a website has “re-
direct[ ]” links that a user clicks on and their computer is redi-
rected to a website where copyrighted clips of video are shown on
their computers.440  In these examples, the technology is still link-
ing performing with publicly performing analogous to how Con-
gress determined that CATV technology was performing
publicly.441  Thus, Justice Breyer did not provide a superfluous anal-
435. See id. at 244.
436. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publish-
ers, 627 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (downloading makes act of streaming non-
public).  Also this court notes that simply downloading does not produce a per-
formance because, in the example of music, the music does not play itself as a file
once downloaded. See id. at 73–74.
437. Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912
(N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), with Live
Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL 79311, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 9, 2007) (website’s streaming of “live audio webcasts” of broadcast racing
events is public).
438. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (2014); see also infra notes 439–40.
439. See Zuffa, LLC v. Kamranian, No. 1:11-cv-036, 2013 WL 1196632, at *1–2,
*6, *9 (D.N.D. Mar. 25, 2013) (noting that public performance occurred when
store owner used his computer to stream UFC fight to “multiple large external
monitors,” which did not allow him to take advantage of Copyright Act exemp-
tion).  In crafting an exemption from 17 U.S.C. § 106, the Copyright Act allows
transmission of a performance as long as the streamed content is over a “single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes.” See 17 U.S.C.
§110(5)(A) (“[C]ommunication of a transmission embodying a performance or
display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless—(i) a direct charge is
made to see or hear the transmission; or (ii) the transmission thus received is
further transmitted to the public.”).  This exemption has been referred to as the
“‘homestyle’ exemption.” See Zuffa, LLC, 2013 WL 1196632, at *7.
440. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d
321, 332 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,
749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984)).
441. Cf. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice
Breyer did not need to analyze whether Aereo was performing publicly because
Court had already determined that Aereo was meant to fall under Act as similar to
CATVs).  For example, the very fact that downloading is not deemed publicly per-
forming is because of what downloading technology is and does. See supra note
436.  Conversely, “streaming thirty-second song clips . . . to potential buyers” was
assumed to be a public performance. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934
F. Supp. 2d 640, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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ysis when he analyzed the public nature of Aereo, as he was prevent-
ing Aereo’s secondary argument that its individual copy model
made it different from the CATV system.442
3. Remaining Concerns
Authors posit that copyright law should allow itself some leeway
in the statute when its principals are at stake.443  The argument is
that one should look at what “copyright law is supposed to do,” but
this sentiment is hollow when the Copyright Act of 1976 was in-
tended to encompass technologies similar to CATV.444  Consiglio
believes the technology should be allowed to evolve alongside an
owner’s right to be paid for originality and creative “incentive.”445
She believes that copyright law has “evolved to benefit creators too
much,” as copyright law is not intended to protect the creator’s
“monopoly.”446  While this sentiment is powerful, it does not ex-
plain how Aereo III failed at striking such a balance.447  Justice
Breyer combatted this issue by narrowing his holding to Aereo’s
technology and functionality.448
V. CONCLUSION: JUSTICE BREYER WAS RIGHT
There is a subtlety to Justice Breyer’s opinion that Justice Scalia
missed.  While Justice Breyer does not spell out every answer to Jus-
442. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2508–09.
443. See Consiglio, supra note 352, at 2602 (“Combining the underlying theo-
ries of copyright law and a historical framework shows that Aereo should not be
considered a copyright infringer despite the Supreme Court’s ruling.”).
444. See id. at 2602–03 (question provoked by Professor Paul Goldstein).  Not
to mention that some argue that keeping the Copyright Act narrowly focused (on
CATV) would prevent money from being infused into producing new content. See
Larkin, supra note 400, at 440.
445. See id. (“Copyright should encourage innovation and ‘the widest possible
production and dissemination of literary and artistic works.’” (quoting Paul Gold-
stein, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (3d ed. 2013))).
446. See id.
447. See id. The author argues that because most of broadcasters’ revenue is
based on advertising, allowing more people to watch the programs (and advertise-
ments) on Aereo-type systems would support Aereo’s model. See id. at 2604.  How-
ever, the argument for Aereo could also be made for Dish TV’s “AutoHop” system
that allows its customers to skip the commercials, so the question of balance is still
not addressed. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1065
(9th Cir. 2013) (involving AutoHop services). But see Katie Wolters, Comment,
Dish Network vs. The Entertainment Industry: How the “AutoHop” Litigation Has Chilled
Technological Advancement, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 493, 517 (2015) (stating Aereo’s legal
issue of public performance is too distinct from Dish’s legal issue of reproduction
right to “clarify” anything).
448. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510 (2014) (“Congress . . . did not intend
to discourage or to control the emergence or use of different kinds of technolo-
gies.  But we do not believe that our limited holding today will have that effect.”).
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tice Scalia’s questions, there are strong implications from the ma-
jority opinion that these questions were addressed.  For instance,
Justice Breyer imports a volitional standard against Aereo.  He does
not ignore the “to the public” analysis, but simply addresses it in
relation to Aereo’s technology.  Whether these answers were to Jus-
tice Scalia’s satisfaction seems to be another story entirely.
Regardless, the subtleness of Justice Breyer’s analysis is vital.
Aereo’s involvement in distributing copyrighted content was more
active than an indirect infringement standard would require.
Aereo’s performances were distributed to the public in individual
transmissions.  Aereo’s model and technology made it an
equivalent to the CATV system, which Congress curtailed in the
Copyright Act of 1976.  Carefully read, Justice Breyer’s opinion
made the correct parallels and arguments in order to narrowly find
Aereo’s actions to constitute direct infringement.  Without this sub-
tle nature, the majority opinion could have fallen prey to Aereo’s
weak salute of technological “innovation.”
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